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November 21, 2007

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KYIV2858 2007-11-21 13:05 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kyiv

DE RUEHKV #2858/01 3251305
P 211305Z NOV 07

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 002858 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2017 
     B. C: RPM-KYIV 11/13 E-MAIL 
Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
1. (C) Summary.  We need to engage now with Ukraine to craft 
a role for this important partner at the April 2008 NATO 
Summit in Bucharest even as Ukrainian political forces are 
focused on building a coalition and forming a new government. 
 While President Yushchenko, FM Yatsenyuk, and Minister of 
Defense Hrytsenko favor a request for a MAP, the politics of 
government formation will prevent an early decision.  There 
is much more to the NATO-Ukraine relationship than just MAP. 
While such a request could emerge, we should prepare now for 
a broader discussion at Bucharest - one that could include 
MAP, but would not be held hostage to it. 
2.  (C)  We believe an effective approach would include the 
following: 1) an early decision to agree to Ukraine's request 
to hold a NUC in Bucharest and to extend an invitation to 
President Yushchenko to attend the Summit, 2) acknowledgment 
at the Summit, through a statement, of Ukraine's extensive 
and positive cooperation with NATO, 3) capturing in the 
statement areas in which NATO and Ukraine can continue to 
deepen their relationship (e.g., air defense cooperation, 
airlift (including a possible helicopter initiative), and 
NATO support for the Euro 2012 soccer championships to be 
held in Ukraine and Poland), and 4) continued discussion in 
Kyiv and Brussels on the topic of MAP. We understand that 
Ukraine may announce its intention at the December 7 NUC in 
Brussels to qualify a unit for inclusion in NATO's Reaction 
Force -- which would merit special acknowledgement at 
Bucharest.  Consideration could also be given to the evolving 
strategic dialogue with Ukraine that encompasses issues such 
as missile defense, CFE, terrorism and cyberdefense.  This 
approach, which could be introduced at the December 7 NUC, 
would reaffirm and strengthen the NATO-Ukraine relationship, 
irrespective of when a new government is formed in Kyiv, and 
without precluding this new government's ability to make a 
decision on requesting a MAP prior to Bucharest.  With 
November 23 finally set as the opening date for the Rada we 
anticipate progress in finalizing a coalition, selecting a 
PM, and determining a forward course on NATO by the end of 
the year.  End Summary. 
MAP Paralysis: Moving Ahead 
3. (C) Over the past several years, consideration of 
when/whether Ukraine would request a MAP has dominated any 
discussion of Ukraine's relationship with NATO.  The 
agressive pursuit of NATO membership under the first Orange 
coalition and FM Tarasyuk was followed in 2006 by the 
disappointment of Ukraine's low profile at the Riga Summit 
(where many had initially hoped that the Alliance would 
welcome a Ukrainian request for a MAP) and by PM Yanukovych's 
go-slow statement during his Brussels visit in September 
2006.  The whiplash effect was felt both in Allied capitals 
and Kyiv, with current discussion stalled at "the door is 
open, Ukraine needs to take the next step."  This may be true 
regarding the issue of MAP, but it has also brought a certain 
perception that there is stagnation in the broader 
NATO-Ukraine relationship -- detracting from current 
cooperation and the potential future wide range of additional 
areas in which NATO-Ukraine interaction could take place.  We 
believe the relationship could be reinvigorated at Bucharest 
by engaging Ukraine, regardless of whether or not Ukraine 
decides to request a MAP. 
Early Invitation for Yushchenko 
4. (C) Instead of waiting for resolution of the internal 
political debates regarding MAP in Kyiv and Brussels, we 
should send a strong signal about the importance of the 
Ukrainian-NATO relationship by accepting the Ukrainian 
request for a NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) meeting in 
Bucharest accompanied by an invitation to President 
Yushchenko.  Foreign Minister Yatsenyuk forwarded on October 
17 a request to the Secretary General for a NUC meeting at 
the highest level at Bucharest.  An early, positive response 
to the invitation would strengthen the hand of pro-NATO 
forces within Ministries and in the Presidential 
Administration, and generate pressure for timely completion 
of the 2008 Annual Target Plan.  More importantly, it would 
put pressure on an incoming coalition government to develop a 
coherent approach toward NATO and to work with Yushchenko on 
formulating a unified approach toward Bucharest. 
Additionally, it would defuse the domestic debate over MAP by 
indicating that NATO remains on the policy agenda 
irrespective of the final outcome on the membership question. 
 We could also use the leverage of the upcoming Summit to 
KYIV 00002858  002 OF 003 
push Yushchenko and the incoming goverment on other key 
political and economic objectives. 
5. (C) In discussions with our Ukrainian (and local European) 
interlocutors Mission Kyiv continues to emphasize that MAP is 
only the first step in a proces
s and does not guarantee 
membership.  Achieving NATO standards will take time and 
continued hard work, and a front-loaded discussion of 
membership and its Article 5 implications should not be 
determinants for MAP consideration.  We have found that an 
open and informed discussion of what MAP is and is not has 
helped us address concerns expressed locally by some of our 
Emphasizing the Positive 
6. (C) In Kyiv our daily interactions with the Presidential 
Secretariat, MFA, MOD, NGOs and others continue to underline 
the high level of interest in engaging on NATO issues.  While 
political uncertainty, inconsistent efforts across some 
Ministries, and budget constraints hinder the effectivness of 
GOU efforts, we see continued progress toward achieving NATO 
standards. Ukraine remains the only PfP member participating 
in all current NATO deployments, and Defense Minister 
Hrytsenko continues to push the Ukrainian Armed Forces toward 
modernization and reform independent of on-going political 
uncertainties.  Ukraine has 34 personnel in Iraq, has 
self-financed its 182 personnel contribution to UKRPOLBAT in 
Kosovo for the past year, and intends to increase 
participation in Operation Active Endeavor with deployment of 
its only helicopter carrying frigate in April 2008.  In 2007 
Ukraine hosted successful SEA BREEZE and RAPID TRIDENT 
exercises, and we see progress on MOD training system reforms 
and better use of foreign defense advisors through the 
establishment of a joint consultative committee. 
7. (C) Additionally, the September 30 elections saw a sharp 
deemphasis of NATO as a hot-button issue, and we are 
witnessing a slow but steady uptick, albeit from a 25 percent 
base, in support levels among the population.  In short, we 
believe that a gradual normalization of the membership issue 
is taking place following the sharply negative politicization 
of NATO membership in the 2004 and 2006 elections.   Giving 
Ukraine a substantive role and result at Bucharest would help 
reinforce these trendlines.  A positive NUC statement 
detailing the key areas of ongoing NATO-Ukraine cooperation 
as well as unilateral Ukrainian efforts would energize and 
help focus future GOU activities.  The statement could 
highlight the potential for developing a strategic dialogue 
on missile defense, CFE, terrorism and cyberdefense.   It 
could also outline expansion of ongoing cooperation and 
specific projects, such as air defense cooperation, expansion 
of airlift cooperation (including a possible helicopter 
initiative), expanded NATO assistance for retired military 
personnel, and NATO assistance for the Euro 2012 soccer 
State-of-Play in Kyiv 
8. (C) While the coalition formation saga continues in Kyiv, 
we have seen no recent change on NATO positions by any of the 
lead political actors.  PM Yanukovych and BYuT leader 
Tymoshenko have maintained their cautious positions (ref A), 
strongly supporting robust cooperation with NATO while 
presenting NATO membership as an "over the horizon" decision. 
 President Yushchenko's request to European partners at the 
October 22 Southeast Europe Defense Minister's meeting in 
Kyiv for assistance in realizing MAP tracks his consistent 
forward-leaning position on NATO (ref B).  We asked FM 
Yatsenyuk during his November 14 meeting with DAS Kramer 
about Ukrainian Ambassador in Washington Shamshur's hint to 
EUR PDAS Volker at a possible MAP request at the December 6 
Ministerial in Brussels (ref C).  Yatsenyuk's response was 
that the issue remained difficult as "some" in Kyiv were 
against a MAP request (we believe he was referencing 
Tymoshenko's overall position and recent refusal to sign a 
letter asking for MAP as one of numerous preconditions for 
Yushchenko's support of her as PM).  Shamshur's statement 
reflects the difficulties MFA is encountering in developing 
and projecting NATO policy during the current political limbo 
in Kyiv. 
9. (C) Preparations for the December 7 NUC have also been 
affected by the coalition formation delay, with the MFA 
unable to clear a draft Joint Statement internally and also 
encountering delays with finalizing Ukrainian Goverment 
approval of the 2007 Annual Target Plan (ATP) evaluation and 
2008 ATP submission.  On the Ukrainian side, the key NUC 
deliverable will be the MFA's plan (shared with us in 
confidence) to announce Ukraine's intention to qualify a unit 
KYIV 00002858  003 OF 003 
for NATO's Reaction Force, a deliverable that had been 
initially intended for the Bucharest Summit.  Another 
positive should be the arrival of new Ambassador Ihor Sagach, 
currently Ambassador to Norway, and DCM Vladyslav Yasniuk, 
who has been acting Director of MFAs NATO Directorate.  Both 
are respected veterans of the MFA's IO and NATO offices and 
should strengthen what has been an underperforming Ukrainian 
NATO Mission.  Additionally, the opening session of the Rada 
(set for November 23), and related deadlines for formation of 
a coalition and government within 30 days or by December 23, 
should end the current policy impasse and hopefully provide a 
clear NATO policy early in its tenure. 
10. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website: 




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