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October 11, 2007

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KYIV2566 2007-10-12 02:18 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kyiv

DE RUEHKV #2566/01 2850218
P 120218Z OCT 07

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 002566 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2017 
REF: A. KYIV 1459 
     B. STATE 8055 
Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
1. (U) Action Request:  See paragraph 13. 
2. (C) Summary.  In consecutive meetings with Ukrainian Chief 
of Defense, General of the Army Serhiy Kyrychenko, Minister 
of Defense Anatoliy Hrytsenko, and Deputy Foreign Minister 
Andriy Veselovsky on October 8, visiting Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (DASD) Debra Cagan expressed continued 
U.S. support for Ukrainian Armed Forces reform, stressed the 
benefits of Ukrainian interoperability gained by deployment 
with U.S. forces and solicited increased Ukrainian Ministry 
of Defense support to U.S. operations in Iraq.  DASD Cagan 
expressed a U.S. wish for Ukraine to increase its number of 
armed forces personnel in Iraq with the purpose of increasing 
capacity for Iraqi police and security forces training.  The 
request was politely received with some reservations from the 
Minister of Defense.  End summary. 
3. (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Coalition, 
Peacekeeping and Multinational Cooperation Debra Cagan and 
her party visited Kyiv October 7-8.  Cagan, accompanied by 
the Ambassador and DATT, met with Minister of Defense 
Anatoliy Hrytsenko, Chief of the General Staff General of the 
Army Serhiy Kyrychenko, and Deputy Foreign Minister Andriy 
Veselovsky.  MFA Arms Control and Military Technical 
Cooperation Director Volodymyr Belashov, U.S. and Canada Desk 
Director Yuriy Nykytiuk, and Third Territorial Department 
(covering the Middle East) Counselor Mykola Leshchenko 
participated in Veselovsky's meeting. 
CHoD: Political Okay Needed to Do More in Iraq 
--------------------------------------------- - 
4. (U) In the meeting with General Kyrychenko, DASD Cagan 
thanked Ukraine for its ongoing support to U.S. operations in 
Iraq where 34 Ukrainian Armed Forces officers and NCOs are 
serving in headquarters staff and training Iraqi security 
forces.  DASD noted that, in many ways, Ukraine has a head 
start on its neighbors in defense reform and interoperability 
with NATO forces due to its rotation of service members 
through Iraq and other operations. 
5. (U) DASD Cagan informed General Kyrychenko that the 
Ukrainian personnel in Iraq have an excellent reputation as 
trainers of Iraqi forces.  U.S. military commanders continue 
to praise their police training work.  Due to the combined 
efforts of the Polish presence with the Iraqi 8th Corps and 
the effective Ukrainian police training, the security 
situation in Diwaniya had improved substantially from two 
months ago.  DASD stated she understood by existing 
Presidential decree the Ukrainian Armed Forces could increase 
their personnel in Iraq up to 50 military personnel.  DASD 
insisted that increasing the number of Ukrainian personnel to 
at least 50 would go a long way in the training of Iraqi 
counter-insurgency police forces.  She added that the Iraqi 
police hold the Ukrainian trainers in such high regard that 
embedding Ukrainian trainers with Iraqi Police outside Camp 
Echo would allow for direct mentorship and yield positive and 
immediate results. 
6. (U) DASD Cagan raised the possibility of off-setting 
certain pre-deployment training costs associated with 
Ukrainian military deployments to Iraq with existing 
Coalition Support Funds.  She added that if the Ukrainian 
military could commit to increased military support to the 
police training mission and expand that commitment to an 
embedded mobile training team, the U.S. would undertake to 
provide airlift, sustainment and necessary equipment 
requirements to support the mission. 
7. (C) In response, General Kyrychenko thanked the U.S. for 
continued support in reform, joint exercises and training 
assistance.  While acknowledging the importance of 
deployments and joint overseas military operations to 
Ukrainian military reform, Kyrychenko stressed that Ukraine 
was "politically and economically limited" in the nature and 
extent of expanding such deployments.  He stated that 
deployment to Iraq was in fact a good school for the 
development and transformation of the Ukrainian military.  It 
provided useful feedback and a test of sorts to allow Ukraine 
to evaluate ongoing reforms.  Kyrychenko allowed that the 
existing Presidential decree permits up to 50 military 
KYIV 00002566  002 OF 003 
personnel in Iraq; however he noted that the nature of the 
mission in training police is not a normal task assigned to 
the Ukrainian Armed Forces and required additional retraining 
of Ukrainian instructors.  He underscored the readiness of 
the Ukrainian Armed Forces to conduct increased deployments 
in support of operations in Iraq, if that decision were taken &#x00
0A;by political authorities. 
DefMin Skeptical About Increasing Numbers 
8. (U) Immediately following the meeting with Kyrychenko, 
DASD Cagan met with Minister Hrytsenko.  DASD expressed 
appreciation for Ukrainian soldiers serving in Iraq.  She 
told Hrytsenko they have been excellent trainers and have 
earned a reputation among Iraqi police as some of the best 
trainers they have had.  Due to Ukrainian and Polish efforts, 
the number of trained Iraqi counter-insurgency police had 
increased enormously.  Addressing the concern about attacks 
against Coalition bases, DASD said the number of attacks 
against Camp Echo had gone down to near zero and repeated the 
observation of the level of violence in Diwaniya being 
substantially decreased.  The training of Iraqi police and 
other security forces had contributed to the overall security 
situation.  8th Iraqi Division and Iraqi police 
interoperability had improved.  Polish forces working with 
the Iraqi Army and Ukrainian soldiers working with 
counter-insurgency police had provided very effective synergy. 
9. (U) DASD Cagan explained that General Petraeus wants to 
move to the next stage of strategy, and he requires 
additional trainers to do this.  His desire was to move U.S. 
forces to areas of high conflict where they are most needed 
and to continue training Iraqi security forces in areas where 
it is doing the most good.  This is where the Ukrainians came 
in.  He would like to see more Ukrainian soldiers 
accomplishing more training in Camp Echo and the surrounding 
area.  Since the Ukrainians have moved away from border 
training in Wasit Province to Camp Echo, they were no longer 
training border guard troops.  They would do the most good by 
training more Iraqi counter-insurgency police and security 
10. (C) Minister Hrytsenko stressed that in accordance with 
the Presidential Decree, Ministry of Interior (MoI) should be 
covering ten personnel positions and State Border Guard 
Service (SBGS) of Ukraine should be covering ten personnel 
positions from the total of 50 allowed.  They have not done 
so to date due to what he called "bureaucratic laziness." 
MoI and SBGS claim they were not trained for this type of 
mission and had not completed the necessary staff work to 
initiate preparation or deployment.  Hrytsenko claimed the 
Interior Troops of the MoI were perfectly competent to 
fulfill the mission as they are a trained military force. 
Hrytsenko continued to insist that MoI and SBGS had to 
realize the intent of the Presidential Decree by fulfilling 
their agreement. 
11. (C) In response to further questioning on Ukraine's 
ability to raise the number of deployed personnel to the 
number allowed by the Presidential Decree (up to 50 
personnel), Hrytsenko claimed the Ukrainian Armed Forces had 
a limited number of qualified personnel to meet the 
requirements of serving in Iraq.  Specifically, he expressed 
concern about language requirements for additional Ukrainian 
trainers in Iraq.  In expressing his reluctance to increase 
the numbers of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, he cited the 
difficulty in finding volunteers, saying wives and mothers do 
not wish to see their men deploying to Iraq which they view 
as being a dangerous place.  According to Hrytsenko, the law 
dictates that deploying personnel must be volunteers for the 
deployment.  (Note: The ChoD, however, had contradicted this 
at the earlier meeting and observed there were three 
volunteers for every one position in Iraq.  End note.) 
12. (C) Comment:  During further discussion, Hrytsenko 
appeared to gain an understanding that Iraqi police forces 
were not being trained for traditional civic police roles, 
but rather to operate in coordination with Iraqi military 
security forces to battle the counter insurgency.  In the 
beginning of the conversation he did not believe armed forces 
personnel should be used to train Iraqi police, but later 
agreed that it was appropriate due to the counter-insurgency 
missions being performed by the Iraqi police.  The discussion 
ended without a firm commitment by Hrytsenko as he expressed 
skepticism that they could increase their current commitment 
KYIV 00002566  003 OF 003 
given the domestic political situation and the perceived 
decreasing security situation in Iraq.  Although he listened 
intently, Hrytsenko appeared to be quite preoccupied, most 
likely due to the continuing negotiations between political 
parties as they work to form a government coalition.  End 
Ukraine's Issues 
13. (C) Hrytsenko continued the discussion with two issues of 
his own.  He first asked about U.S. plans concerning Iran (he 
was asking if the U.S. was making plans to attack or invade 
Iran), to which, DASD said the U.S. has no intention of 
attacking or invading Iran, repeating the President's policy 
and statements.  The second issue was one Hrytsenko has asked 
us in the past (see reftels) regarding the planned deployment 
of a U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System in Central Europe. 
 Hrytsenko claims that the U.S. written response to his 
questions concerning BMDS sites in Central Europe differed 
from the more positive response to his questions provided 
orally by MDA heaad General Obering during his visit to Kyiv. 
 Hrytsenko claimed this put Ukraine in a very difficult 
position, and if the answers previously provided by the U.S. 
represent U.S. policy (ref B), then there will be 
geo-political complications for Ukraine.  His three basic 
questions are: 1) Will the U.S. provide launch warning to all 
concerned countries of the region?  2) Will the U.S. allow a 
verification regime to be constructed allowing inspection of 
the BMD sites?  And 3) Will the U.S. allow Russian and 
Ukrainian military officers to work on a permanent basis at 
the BMD sites?  Hrytsenko said that he would raise these 
issues with SecDef Gates when he visits Kyiv October 21-22. 
Department's guidance on these two issues would be 
Foreign Ministry Cautious As Well 
14. (C) Veselovsky responded to Cagan's request that Ukraine 
consider providing the full Presidential authorization of 50 
personnel to the Iraq training mission by noting that the 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) felt that its personnel resources 
were stretched to the limit.  The Defense Ministry leadership 
was keenly interested in improving interoperability, but, 
with 37,000 Ukrainians having served in international 
peacekeeping operations, MOD was encountering difficulty in 
rotating overseas deployments in a balanced fashion 
throughout the entire uniformed force.  Nevertheless, Foreign 
Ministry representatives continued to make the case for 
Ukraine's PKO participation in discussions with MOD 
15. (C) On a political level, Preside
nt Yushchenko's decision 
to withdraw Ukrainian troops from participation in the 
Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I) had been widely supported; 
redeployment of combat troops would be difficult.  (At this 
point, Cagan noted that this was not what she was 
requesting.)  Veselovsky said MFA hoped to convince the 
Ministry of Interior to contribute the personnel envisioned 
in the Presidential Decree, but would also continue to engage 
with MOD on the question.  Cagan responded that the police 
training mission was not civil police training, but 
counterinsurgency training, at which the Ukrainian military 
had demonstrated that it excelled.  She cautioned that the 
U.S. would be cautious about the deployment of MOI forces, 
with an unproven track record, and observed that, above all, 
the military prefers to know, and be able to trust, the 
forces on its right and left on the battle front and that 
they be interoperable.  Veselovsky said Ukraine's Interior 
Troops differed from the police in other European countries, 
resembling a militia more, and that the MOI had already 
proven its capability during PKO operations in Kosovo. 
16. (U) DASD Cagan has cleared this cable. 
17. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website: 




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