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May 25, 2007

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KYIV1299 2007-05-25 14:45 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Kyiv


DE RUEHKV #1299/01 1451445
P 251445Z MAY 07

S E C R E T KYIV 001299 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2017 
REF: A. KYIV 1104 
     B. STATE 65709 
     C. KYIV 751 
     D. KYIV 210 
     E. KYIV 163 
     F. STATE 5539 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4(b,c,d) 
1. (S) Summary:  Deputy Defense Minister Tereshchenko told 
visiting PM/WRA Deputy Director Steven Costner May 16 that 
the Ukrainian offer to provide 2,101 Man-Portable Air Defense 
System (MANPADS) missiles and 582 gripstocks (ref E) for the 
NATO PfP Trust Fund destruction project had been made in 
error.  MoD would only be able to provide 382 Strela missiles 
and 197 gripstocks for destruction.  Costner said the U.S. 
would not be able to contribute an additional $2 million to 
the Trust Fund project for the destruction of larger caliber 
conventional munitions, since the additional funds had been 
in response to agreement on the destruction of the 2,101 
missiles and not the significantly lower, new figure. 
Tereshchenko also confirmed the information transmitted ref A 
that the Ukrainian MoD would be unable to provide Igla or 
Igla-1 missiles for any purpose, but suggested unofficially 
that 140 such missiles, currently not in operational 
condition, might be overhauled sufficiently to meet U.S. 
testing purposes.  He would discuss the possible transfer of 
the missiles with the Defense Minister and hoped to provide a 
follow-up in the form of a letter during the week of May 21. 
During a May 17 meeting, MFA Arms Control Director Belashov 
explained that a new Interdepartmental Commission for 
Military-Technical Cooperation and Export Control Policy had 
made the decision on April 12 not to sell or dispose of Igla 
and Igla-1 missiles until 2011.  End summary. 
A High-Level Decision 
2. (U) PM/WRA Deputy Director Steven Costner, DOD official 
Jim Lake and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Aircraft 
Protection Program Executive Doctor Herman Rediess, during a 
May 15-18 visit to Kyiv, met with Deputy Defense Minister 
Volodymyr Tereshchenko and separately with MFA Arms Control 
Department Director Volodymyr Belashov.  Although Belashov's 
meeting occurred later, on May 17, his comments put 
Tereshchenko's into context and are provided first.  MFA Arms 
Control Department Third Secretary Konstantin Ivashchenko was 
Belashov's notetaker. 
3. (S) Belashov indicated that the written response provided 
to Embassy May 9 (ref A) of the Ukrainian government refusal 
of a U.S. request for a mixture of 500 Igla-1 and 1,000 Igla 
MANPADS missiles for countermeasures development (ref D) had 
been the result of a high-level interagency meeting held 
April 12.  (Note: In a March 6 decree, President Yushchenko 
reorganized the Committee for Military-Technical Cooperation 
and Export Control Policy, of which Belashov had been a 
member, into a higher-level Interdepartmental Commission for 
Military-Technical Cooperation and Export Control Policy. 
Belashov earlier told us the deputy ministers of the relevant 
ministries were members of the commission.  The decree 
designated National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) First 
Deputy Secretary Valeriy Khoroshkovsky as the Commission's 
chairman (who has since resigned from his NSDC position) and 
subordinated the Commission to the NSDC.  A news story noted 
the Commission would have particular responsibility to 
"handle proposals on maintaining, limiting, terminating, or 
restoring military and technical cooperation with other 
4. (S) Belashov said he had a written statement of the 
Commission's decision, which, unfortunately, he was unable to 
provide to the visiting delegation.  The Commission and the 
NSDC had decided not to transfer or dispose of any Igla or 
Igla-1 missiles until 2011 and had instructed MFA to so 
inform the U.S.  He did not know why the limitation only 
applied until 2011.  MFA helped coordinate on the issues of 
cooperation on MANPADS countermeasures development and the 
NATO PfP Trust Fund destruction project, but MoD had the lead 
on both; he implied that MoD had acted hastily and improperly 
in suggesting earlier that Igla and Igla-1 missiles were 
available.  (Note: Belashov's further comments made clear 
that the paper he was drawing from was the same as the one 
that Embassy received May 9.  He had just returned from the 
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, JCIC, meeting in 
Geneva, and so was unaware that the paper had already been 
passed.  He reacted with a flash of anger directed at his 
subordinate, Oleh Belokolos, when we said we thought we had 
received a copy.  Belokolos later told us that he had 
satisfactorily justified his actions to Belashov.) 
Walking Back
an MOD Offer 
5. (S) During the May 16 meeting with Tereshchenko, Costner 
reviewed MoD's support to the NATO PfP Trust Fund destruction 
project and deployed the points in ref B to urge MoD to 
respond positively to the U.S. request for MANPADS missiles 
for countermeasures development purposes.  He stressed that 
the U.S. was prepared to consider a deal that included fewer 
than the 1,500 missiles requested.  Rediess provided a 
detailed briefing on DHS efforts to reduce the terrorist 
threat of MANPADS to civil aviation. 
6. (S) Tereshchenko said he had met May 15 with the military 
General Staff to get an update on the status of MoD's 
response to the U.S. requests.  As a result of this input, he 
could clarify that MoD was prepared to provide 382 Strela 
missiles and 197 gripstocks for the NATO-PfP destruction 
project.  When questioned, he said the Strela missiles were 
all that were available for destruction.  Costner recalled 
that Tereshchenko had earlier offered to provide 2,101 
missiles and 582 gripstocks for the destruction project, in 
return for which the U.S. had agreed to provide $2 million to 
the project specifically to address Ukraine's priority for 
destruction of large-caliber munitions.  Costner had been 
consulting extensively with the NATO Maintenance and Supply 
Agency to amend the original destruction project plans on the 
basis of this agreement.  The reduced number of missiles for 
destruction could not justify the additional U.S. 
contribution, which would also not be pro-rated for the 
smaller figure. 
7. (S) Tereshchenko weakly explained that the 2,101 missiles 
had been the number available for destruction and for 
commercial sale together, and that poor staff work had 
resulted in the misunderstanding that all the missiles could 
be provided for the destruction project.  If the U.S. was 
interested in acquiring Strela MANPADS missiles (i.e., SA-7s 
and SA-14s) on a commercial basis, MoD could provide the 
offer to the Cabinet of Ministers for its consideration.  For 
now, however, no Igla-1 or Igla missiles (i.e., SA-16s or 
SA-18s) were available either for sale or destruction.  He 
had met with the Defense Minister May 15 and would meet him 
again to report on the outcome of his meeting with Costner 
and his colleagues.  Tereshchenko would urge the Defense 
Minister to reconsider the Ukrainian position on Igla and 
Igla-1 missiles. 
8. (S) Stressing that he was speaking off-the-record and 
personally, Tereshchenko said MoD had 140 "Igla" (during the 
discussion, Tereshchenko seemed to be using Igla to refer to 
both Igla or Igla-1 missiles) that were in "category three" 
condition, or not operational.  The missiles could be 
overhauled and put into operational condition.  Tereshchenko 
asked for a written U.S. request for MANPADS missiles to be 
used as a basis for considering the option of providing the 
category three Iglas to the U.S.  When Costner said such a 
written request had been provided by Ambassador Taylor to 
Defense Minister Hrytsenko shortly after Costner's last visit 
in January (ref D), Tereshchenko said he would have his staff 
locate the letter.  He would meet with Hrytsenko and the 
Chief of the General Staff and hoped to provide a written 
response on the possible transfer of the 140 Igla missiles 
during the week of May 21.  (Note:  According to Belashov, 
final approval for such a transfer would not be up to 
Hrytsenko and/or the C 
hief of the General Staff alone, but would have to be 
approved by the Interdepartmental Commission for 
Military-Technical Cooperation and Export Control Policy, 
given the Commission's April 12 decision.  End note.) 
9. (S) Costner stated that he realized these were not easy 
decisions for the GOU, but stressed that the USG had 
intentionally made proposals that would be mutually 
beneficial:  Regarding destruction, in return for the 
missiles the GOU would receive much needed funds to address 
its top priority for destruction - larger caliber munitions. 
Regarding acquisition, the USG offered detailed briefings on 
our MANPADS countermeasures testing program, an invitation 
for Ukrainian representatives to attend live-fire tests at 
White Sands New Mexico in the fall, an exchange of 
exploitation data resulting from those tests, and an offer of 
a U.S. assessment of the vulnerability of aircraft departing 
and leaving Boryspil airport to MANPADS attacks.  Costner 
urged Tereshchenko and his colleagues to once more review the 
two proposals as joint cooperative efforts to address 
mutually beneficial goals. 
Ukrainian Countermeasures Presentation 
10. (C) Consistent with the offer made in late March (ref C), 
on May 17, the ADRON Research and Development Company, Ltd. 
hosted the U.S. delegation to provide a briefing on its 
"Adros" infrared countermeasures system for combating MANPADS 
launches.  After the briefing and a detailed question and 
answer session, Costner made clear that U.S. experts would 
study the information, but that he could make no assurances 
regarding future consultations or potential purchases. 
(Note:  The subsequent preliminary assessment by Dr. Rediess 
of DHS was that the Ukrainian system did not meet the more 
stringent requirements set forth for U.S. countermeasures 
systems.  This position has not yet been provided to ADRON or 
GOU representatives, but likely will be communicated in the 
course of future MANPADS consultations.  End note.) 
11. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website: 




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