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March 30, 2007

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KYIV751 2007-03-30 12:35 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Kyiv


DE RUEHKV #0751/01 0891235
P 301235Z MAR 07

S E C R E T KYIV 000751 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2017 
REF: A. KYIV 210 
     B. KYIV 163 (NOTAL) 
     C. STATE 5539 (NOTAL) 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4(b,c,d) 
1. (U) This is an action request.  See para 3. 
2. (S) Summary:  During a March 28 meeting with 
Ukrspetsexport and Ministry of Defense representatives, an 
MOD official said that in response to the U.S. request for 
additional MANPADS to be used for counter measures 
development, other than the delivery of 380 Igla and Igla-1 
MANPADS missiles under a current contract, the Ukrainian 
military had no further Igla and Igla-1 missiles that were 
excess to its needs to provide to the U.S.  A Ukrspetsexport 
representative said the company was ready to provide MANPADS 
missiles in any quantity and compensation level agreed to by 
the Ukrainian government.  When we asked the MOD 
representative again whether this was a final GOU position, 
he clarified that the MOD position was still subject to a 
Ukrainian government inter-agency review process that would 
involve the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) and 
the Foreign Ministry.  End summary. 
3. (S) Comment and Action Request:  Although the Ukrainian 
inter-agency review process could lead to a reversal of the 
MOD position, we are not optimistic that the NSDC or Foreign 
Ministry would overrule an argument based on military 
operational requirements.  At the next opportunity, the 
Ambassador will seek to confirm the MOD position with DefMin 
Hrytsenko, and we will also seek an appointment with Deputy 
Defense Minister Tereshchenko, currently ill, to discuss the 
issue further.  We recommend however that, despite the 
setback, we continue to engage the Ukrainians on the 
possibility of further cooperation on MANPADS countermeasures 
development.  One way to do this would be for a briefing 
team, presumably from the Department of Homeland Security, to 
visit Kyiv to describe the current USG MANPADS 
countermeasures development program.  Request that Department 
advise whether this visit could take place and, if agreed, 
when.  End comment. 
4. (U) DOD experts James Lake, Wayne Burrell, and Jose 
Mendez, Assistant Army Attache LTC Patrick Crabb, and poloff 
met with Ukrspetsexport (USE) and Ministry of Defense (MOD) 
officials March 28, per Defense Minister Hrytsenko's 
suggestion (ref A).  USE First General Director Oleksandr 
Kovalenko and MOD Weapons and Advanced Technology Development 
and Acquisition Department Director Volodymyr Grek were the 
primary speakers on the Ukrainian side, which numbered about 
a dozen people.  ADRON Research and Development Company Chief 
Designer Sergei Turenko also briefed on his company's 
products and research and development programs. 
Reinforcing the Message 
5. (S) We began the meeting by stressing that we were 
proposing that the U.S. and Ukraine cooperate to counter a 
common MANPADS threat.  The U.S. was directing increasing 
efforts to find effective defenses against MANPADS, which had 
been used by terrorists against both military aircraft and 
civil aviation.  We had proposed to provide a modest amount 
of compensation to Ukraine for the delivery of MANPADS, but 
the funds were promised to enable USE and MOD to avoid 
time-consuming procedures to overcome the absence of any 
legal foundation for transfers of MANPADS (or any MOD-owned 
equipment) at no cost.  We were willing to brief Ukrainian 
government officials regarding U.S. MANPADS countermeasures 
efforts and to share some of our data.  Lake said the U.S. 
had a continuing need for the Igla (SA-18) and Igla-1 (SA-16) 
MANPADS missiles for a variety of countermeasures development 
efforts.  He and his colleagues were ready to discuss details 
of the contract process and the logistics of MANPADS 
USE's Position 
6. (S) Kovalenko said USE could work out the procedures for a 
transfer of MANPADS, but the MANPADS missiles that it might 
supply were property of the Ukrainian government, and 
specifically MOD.  USE was ready to facilitate any MOD and 
Ukrainian government decision.  USE officials fully 
understood the security threat that MANPADS posed and the 
importance of developing defenses against them.  He stressed, 
as later did Grek, that, in recent years, USE has transferred 
Igla and Igla-1 MANPADS missiles only to the U.S.  Kovalenko 
did not see any fundamental obstacles to the U.S. request for 
1,000 Igla-1 and 500 Igla missiles.  USE already had an open 
contract, with all the necessary approvals received, to 
supply 120 Igla-1 and 260 Igla missiles to the "U.S. Army." 
USE was pre
pared to execute on the contract "immediately" to 
deliver the total 380 missiles.  After the introductory 
remarks, Kovalenko turned the floor to Grek, excused himself, 
and left the conference room. 
MOD's Reply 
7. (C) Grek took a markedly different tack when he next 
spoke.  After DefMin Hrytsenko had instructed him to 
participate in the meeting, Grek met March 14 with First 
Deputy Defense Minister Polyakov.  Polyakov had said MOD 
would help to expedite the transfer of the 380 MANPADS 
missiles under the existing contract.  While the MOD 
leadership understood the importance of the MANPADS threat, 
MOD was not in a position to transfer any additional Igla and 
Igla-1 missiles to the U.S. once the existing contract was 
fulfilled.  The Ukrainian military continued to require such 
MANPADS missiles for force protection for peacekeeping and 
other operations and, unfortunately, no replacements for the 
Igla and Igla-1 were under development or planned for 
procurement.  In fact, existing stocks of the missiles were 
insufficient for Ukrainian military needs.  Deliveries of 
Strela MANPADS missiles were still a possibility. 
8. (C) At the end of the meeting, we requested clarification 
of Grek's statement.  Did he mean to say the Ukrainian 
government was rejecting the USG offer for cooperation on 
MANPADS countermeasures?  Grek seemed caught off-guard by the 
blunt question, but then said his stated position was the MOD 
position.  MOD still needed to consult with Foreign Ministry 
(MFA) and the National Security and Defense Council, first at 
the staff level.  The NSDC Secretariat might elect to put the 
issue on the agenda of the next NSDC meeting, chaired by 
President Yushchenko (and including Prime Minister 
Yushchenko) and due to be held next in April.  Grek 
acknowledged that there were political and economic factors 
that might outweigh the MOD's military operational argument. 
ADROS Presentation 
9. (U) Grek said MOD was also undertaking efforts to develop 
electronic equipment to protect military and civilian 
aircraft against MANPADS.  DefMin Hrytsenko had ordered the 
installation of such a system on Ukrainian military 
helicopters after the Ukrainian military had verified the 
defensive system's effectiveness.  The company that developed 
the system was prepared to carry out joint development 
programs with the U.S. DOD to develop MANPADS 
countermeasures.  Grek introduced Turenko and invited him to 
10. (U) Turenko said ADRON was engaged in several efforts in 
the field of MANPADS countermeasures, including the 
development of equipment to decrease the infra-red visibility 
of aircraft, to detect and locate missile launches, and to 
protect aircraft against small-arms fire.  His company's 
KT-01AV ADROS system was designed to defend against MANPADS 
and air-to-air missiles, such as the SIDEWINDER, that use 
infra-red guidance.  The system was a single-unit device that 
mounted easily and weighed 26 kilograms.  The ADRON worked 
against guidance systems that were amplitude, frequency, and 
pulse modulated.  It operated continuously from take-off to 
landing and protected against several missiles 
simultaneously.  ADROS had an operational effectiveness rate 
of 80 percent, based on field testing of the system. 
The Way Forward 
11. (C) After we expressed our disappointment at Grek's news, 
he said that he did not want to say that bilateral 
discussions had ended.  A final answer on the U.S. proposal 
would have to be provided by the appropriate official after 
full consideration.  (Note:  We will also raise this issue 
with senior MOD leadership to ensure to confirm Grek's 
statements made to the team.  End Note.)  We said that, 
despite this setback, we would recommend that the U.S. 
continue to engage and cooperate with Ukraine on possible 
joint development of MANPADS countermeasures.  A briefing 
team could possibly visit Kyiv to describe U.S. efforts to 
develop MANPADS countermeasures in greater detail.  The 
Department of Homeland Security might be particularly 
interested in ADRON's progress in detecting and locating 
missile launches.  Grek welcomed the possibility of future 
briefings and noted that, if the briefing team were 
interested, a visit could be arranged to ADRON's production 
12. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website: 




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