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January 22, 2007

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KYIV163 2007-01-22 12:57 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Kyiv


DE RUEHKV #0163/01 0221257
P 221257Z JAN 07

S E C R E T KYIV 000163 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2017 
REF: A. STATE 5539 
     B. 06 KYIV 4432 
     C. 06 KIEV 3300 
     D. 06 STATE 134827 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4(b,c,d) 
1. (S) Summary: As a result of a January 17 meeting with 
Deputy Defense Minister Tereshchenko on the proposals 
regarding man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) 
contained ref A, PM/WRA will work with the NATO Maintenance 
and Supply Agency (NAMSA) to develop an amendment to the 
NATO/PfP Trust Fund to lock in a Ukrainian offer to provide 
an additional 2,101 MANPADS missiles and 584 gripstocks to 
the Trust Fund and the U.S. offer to contribute an additional 
$2 million for the Trust Fund to destroy large-caliber 
munitions.  At the meeting, we stressed to Tereshchenko that 
the full $5 million of our original offer could be made 
available if Ukraine provided 5,000 additional MANPADS, 
instead of 2,101, for Trust Fund destruction.  Tereshchenko 
committed to engage other Ministry of Defense and uniformed 
staff officials to explore this possibility.  On the question 
of MANPADS for countermeasures development, we said that, 
recognizing the legal difficulties of Ukraine providing 
MANPADS at no cost, we could provide $5 million to the 
Ukrainian government in exchange for 1,500 MANPADS. 
Ambassador will provide this offer in writing (in the form of 
a non-paper based on the guidance in Ref A) during his next 
meeting with Defense Minister Hrytsenko.  Text of the U.S. 
offer is in para 12.  End summary. 
2. (S) Visiting EUR/PRA Director Anita Friedt, PM/WRA Deputy 
Director Steven Costner, and DOD and Embassy Kyiv 
representatives met Deputy Defense Minister Volodymyr 
Tereshchenko January 17 to lay out ref A proposals to provide 
funding to the NATO PfP Trust Fund project for large-caliber 
munitions destruction in exchange for Ukrainian provision of 
additional MANPADS missiles for destruction and to reimburse 
the Ukrainian government for a supply of MANPADS missiles to 
be used in countermeasures development.  When Costner 
explained that, unfortunately, the Washington-based visitors 
had been unable to secure an appointment with First Deputy 
Defense Minister Leonid Polyakov, Tereshchenko said such a 
meeting would not have been necessary since he was directly 
responsible for all issues related to MANPADS. 
NATO PfP Trust Fund 
3. (C) On the NATO PfP Trust Fund project, Costner said he 
wanted to emphasize that the U.S. was committed to remain 
lead nation on the project regardless of the outcome of 
bilateral discussions regarding destruction of additional 
MANPADS.  The USG appreciated the importance of destroying 
small arms, light weapons, and munitions as well as MANPADS 
and wanted to move forward on all of these to complete the 
first phase of the projected 12-year project.  During the 
July nonproliferation working group meeting, he had proposed 
that the U.S. would contribute an additional U.S. $5 million 
for destruction of large-caliber munitions if Ukraine would 
contribute an additional 10,000 MANPADS missiles for 
4. (C) Costner continued that the U.S. had tried to fashion a 
proposal that would address the priorities of each party, 
i.e., Ukraine's interest in destroying large-caliber 
munitions and the U.S. interest in destroying MANPADS.  In 
tabling the proposal, the U.S. intended to expand the scope 
of the phase one project and not to substitute destruction of 
large-caliber munitions for some other element, such as small 
arms/light weapons (SA/LW) destruction.  The U.S. had 
received the Ukrainian offer to destroy an additional 2,099 
MANPADS, not the 10,000 requested.  The U.S. had suggested 
destruction of 10,000 based on its understanding of the large 
quantity of MANPADS that were obsolete or excess to Ukrainian 
defense needs.  He would be interested in Tereshchenko's 
assessment of the possibility of increasing Ukraine's offer 
beyond 2,099. 
The Ukrainian "Counter-offer" 
5. (C) Smiling broadly, Tereshchenko said Ukraine had already 
been responsive even before receiving Costner's request.  The 
document that he had before him detailed that Ukraine would 
provide 2,101 MANPADS, not the 2,099 figure that Costner had 
used, and 584 gripstocks.  He stressed that he had not 
plucked the number out of thin air; the figure had been 
reached after intensive discussions with the Chief of the 
General Staff (CHOD) and the CHOD's subordinates responsible 
for weapons stockpile management.  He urged Costner to 
proceed on the basis of the current Ukrainian offer.  He 
would nevertheless enter into renewed discussions with his 
uniformed counterparts to investigate the possibility of 
increasing the number of MANPADS.  An increase in the 
rainian offer, however, would take time. 
6. (C) Indicating his understanding, Costner said he was not 
in a position to provide a full $5 million in response to the 
Ukrainian offer of two thousand additional missiles. 
Although the original U.S. request had been for 10,000 
MANPADS, the U.S. would contribute the full $5 million in 
exchange for destruction of an additional 5,000 MANPADS.  If 
Ukraine had to stick to its current offer of 2,000 MANPADS, 
the U.S. would only contribute an additional $2 million for 
destruction of large-caliber munitions, but that the other $3 
million would remain available for a potential subsequent 
agreement.  He would speak with NATO Maintenance and Supply 
Agency (NAMSA) project officer Steve Brown to finalize an 
addendum or appendix to the current project document to put 
the U.S. and Ukrainian offers into writing.  NAMSA would need 
to sign appropriate documents with both Ukraine and the U.S. 
Costner also noted that NAMSA's preliminary and rough 
estimates indicated that $2 million would fund the 
destruction of 6,000 tons of large-caliber munitions, while 
$5 million would destroy 15,000 tons.  Once the 
infrastructure was in place, however, significantly greater 
tonnages of munitions could be destroyed in follow-on phases 
of the project. 
7. (C) Tereshchenko expressed his appreciation for Costner's 
frank and straightforward presentation and reiterated his 
intention to engage other officials in the Ministry of 
Defense and military staff about the possibility of 
increasing the number of MANPADS for destruction. 
MANPADS Countermeasures 
8. (S) When Tereshchenko said he had to get to his next 
meeting, Costner provided a telescoped presentation of the 
U.S. offer on MANPADS for countermeasures development.  He 
recalled that the U.S. had requested Ukraine supply 300 
Strela-3 MANPADS, 700 Igla-1, and 1,000 Iglas at no cost on 
the basis that the missiles would be used to develop 
countermeasures of mutual benefit to enhance the safety of 
military and civil aviation.  Such cooperation was a natural 
step for allies facing a common threat. 
9. (S) Costner said the U.S. had now reassessed its proposal 
based on input from Ukrainian officials that transfer of 
MANPADS at no cost had no legal basis and an update on its 
needs for MANPADS for countermeasures development.  Instead 
of 2,000 MANPADS, the U.S. needed 1,500.  The 1,500 MANPADS 
required consisted of 500 Igla-1 and 1,000 Iglas.  The latest 
request eliminated the Strela-3 missile, reduced the number 
of Igla-1 requested, and reduced the total number requested. 
While the U.S. still viewed MANPADS countermeasures 
development to be a joint effort by allies facing a common 
threat, it was prepared to provide $5 million toward the 
project.  The $5 million amount did not include 
transportation costs, from Ukraine to the United States, 
which the USG would also cover. 
10. (S) Costner explained the missiles would be used in 
various tests of countermeasures under development.  As one 
example, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security would need 
missiles sometime in October 2007 to test two different 
systems.  U.S. experts, however, would need to have the 
missiles in hand no later than June to complete the necessary 
preparations.  Ukrainian officials were welcome to view this 
11. (S) Tereshchenko said he felt confident that the latest 
U.S. proposal could be implemented and asked to receive the 
proposal in writing.  We will pass a non-paper, text below 
(drafted in Kyiv by PM/WRA deputy director Costner based on 
the guidance ref A and in consultation with DoD experts and 
EUR/PRA Director Friedt), during the Ambassador's next 
meeting with Defense Minister Hrytsenko.  (Note:  Ambassador 
originally had a meeting scheduled January 19, but this 
meeting was postponed.) 
12. (S-REL UP) Begin text of non-paper. 
Proposal for Transfer of Ukrainian MANPADS to the United 
The United States is deeply appreciative of Ukraine's past 
participation in the Multinational Force in Iraq.  As you 
well know, these forces are vulnerable to attack from 
man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).  Although Ukraine 
has reduced its presence, we need your help in protecting 
these forces. 
It has been reported that several thousand of these systems 
may have entered the black market after the collapse of 
Saddam's regime.  Although multinational forces were able to 
recover and destroy many of those MANPADS missiles, 
significant numbers remain in the hands of insurgent forces 
and are being fired at Multinational Force aircraft. 
Due to the prevalence of SA-16 (Igla-1) systems and their 
current use by insurgents in Iraq, it is a priority to 
analyze such systems to develop the best countermeasure 
techniques and technologies to protect the Multinational 
Force-Iraq, as well as NATO forces in Afghanistan. 
Additionally, we believe it is only a matter of time before 
SA-18 (Igla) systems also fall into the wrong hands and pose 
a threat to coalition aircraft.  Therefore we urgently 
request from Ukraine both SA-16s and SA-18s to assist in 
developing more effective countermeasures. 
Our original request in July 2006 (and in an August 16, 2006, 
letter from Under Secretary Robert Joseph to Minister 
Hrytsenko) was for 2000 MANPADS missiles (300 Strela-3, 700 
Igla-1, and 1000 Igla) at no cost.  Our rationale for this 
request has been that this is not a typical commercial sale, 
but instead a proposal for cooperation among allies to 
address a common threat. 
Since making our original proposal, we have reviewed our 
needs -- which include a reduced requirement for the (SA-14) 
Strela-3.  Additionally, while we continue to view this 
proposal not as a typical commercial transaction, but as a 
proposal for cooperation among allies to address a common 
threat, we have heard from the Government of Ukraine (GOU) 
concerning the difficulties faced in providing the missiles 
at no charge. 
With the above-mentioned factors in mind, we would like to 
submit the following revised proposal: 
-- The Government of the United States requests that the 
Government of Ukraine provide the USG with 1500 MANPADS 
missiles (1000 Igla and 500 Igla-1). 
-- Although the USG still does not consider this a commercial 
sale, we would provide $5 million to the GOU to help address 
Ukraine's financial concerns.  This does not include costs 
covering transportation from Ukraine to the United States, 
which would be covered by the USG. 
These missiles would be used for various countermeasures 
tests.  For example, the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) has an immediate need for both types of missiles to 
test against two competing countermeasure systems in 
development for commercial aviation.  This test is scheduled 
for October 2007, and receipt of
 the missiles would be 
required no later than June 2007 in order for U.S. experts to 
perform the necessary preparations. 
If desired by the GOU, Ukrainian experts could attend the 
October test.  We also could have appropriate experts come to 
Kyiv to brief Ukrainian counterparts on the test in advance, 
as well as to discuss other details of this proposal in more 
The GOU's cooperation in this endeavor not only could save 
the lives of many people associated with the Multinational 
Force, but also enhance the safety of civil aviation.  In 
addition, it is a concrete, positive step in forging a closer 
relationship with the NATO allies. 
End text. 
13. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website: 




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