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07KYIV133, UKRAINE: KOSOVO STATUS PROCESS TIMELINE: DEMARCHE

January 19, 2007

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KYIV133 2007-01-19 14:23 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kyiv

VZCZCXRO2960
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKV #0133 0191423
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191423Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0962
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 000133 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2017 
TAGS: PREL PBTS OPDC UNMIK UN YI MD RS UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: KOSOVO STATUS PROCESS TIMELINE: DEMARCHE 
DELIVERED 
 
REF: A. STATE 5652 
 
     B. KYIV 4413 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) Summary/comment: In view of Ukrainian officials' 
previous concerns about the impact of Kosovo independence on 
"frozen conflicts" in Moldova and elsewhere, acting DCM drew 
on ref A background to brief DFM Veselovsky January 18 on the 
Kosovo settlement process.  While underscoring that Ukraine's 
views did not support the Russian position, Veselovsky urged 
the U.S. to move slowly and on the basis of a consensus by 
parties concerned on the way forward.  Veselovsky's comments 
represented an incremental change in the Ukrainian position. 
While he obliquely noted the impact that Kosovo settlement 
would have on "frozen conflicts" and urged a "go-slow" 
approach, Veselovsky did not appear to dispute that Kosovo 
would eventually have to become independent.  End 
summary/comment. 
 
2. (C) Drawing on ref A background, acting DCM and poloff 
notetaker met January 18 with Deputy Foreign Minister Andriy 
Veselovsky and MFA First Secretary Ihor Kulish to brief them 
on U.S. expectations for developments in Kosovo after the 
January 21 Serbian parliamentary elections.  Noting that EUR 
A/S Fried had said as much during the November 16 political 
directors meeting in Kyiv (ref B), A/DCM stressed that the 
U.S. saw no alternative to independence for Kosovo.  UN 
Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari was developing a comprehensive 
Kosovo settlement package, on which he would consult with 
both Belgrade and Pristina.  By March, he would present the 
package to the UN Security Council, paving the way for a new 
UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) to replace UNSCR 1244. 
 (On the last point, Veselovsky expressed skepticism that a 
new UNSCR would be possible in the face of Russian opposition 
to Kosovo independence.)  A/DCM emphasized that a united U.S. 
and European position was essential to the success of the 
timeline. 
 
3. (C) Veselovsky thanked A/DCM and said the information 
would be helpful as the Ukrainian government reviewed its 
position.  He perhaps put more weight on the importance of 
the Serbian elections than did the U.S., and would not want 
to predetermine actions before the event.  He then drew our 
attention to a January 16 Moldovan news agency Infotag report 
of Romanian President Traian Basescu's visit to Chisinau the 
same day.  Basescu's comments were important from two 
aspects.  First, he made a connection between Kosovo and 
Transnistria and, second, he said Moldova's territorial 
integrity should be preserved, as it should be in Kosovo. 
Veselovsky said he understood  that other EU countries shared 
the Romanian view and that the EU might not be so willing to 
proceed according to the timeline that A/DCM had briefed. 
 
4. (U) Note:  In the report, Basescu and Moldovan President 
Vladimir Voronin agreed that Kosovo settlement would affect, 
even if indirectly, prospects for resolving the Transnistrian 
conflict.  Basescu is also reported as saying Transnistrian 
settlement should be based on three requirements: Moldova's 
territorial integrity, inviolability of Moldova's borders, 
and no granting of collective rights to ethnic minorities. 
Basescu felt that ethnic minorities should be granted rights, 
but not rights that would lead to the creation of other 
states.  End note. 
 
5. (C) Veselovsky said he did not want Ukraine to be lumped 
with Russia regarding Kosovo.  Russia was interested in 
preserving its position in the Balkans and undercutting the 
European Union and the trans-Atlantic alliance.  Ukraine, on 
the other hand, wished to support the EU and Moldova.  His 
remarks were directed toward reaching common goals, but doing 
it in way that was better and more certain.  Living as he did 
in Europe, he understood the sensitive implications of 
changing national boundaries and adjusting borders to match 
ethnic communities.  The principle that changes would be made 
only upon the mutual agreement of the parties concerned was 
an important one that had to be preserved.  He urged the U.S. 
to consider some preliminary stage for Kosovo, perhaps some 
sort of protectorate under EU auspices, that would allow 
Serbia to adjust to its changed relationship to Kosovo.  This 
approach should be developed as a back-up, in the event that 
the situation in the Balkans should turn violent and in case 
the UN Security Council needed to review its Kosovo policy. 
He conceded that the international community could not go 
back, but he cautioned against going forward too quickly. 
 
6. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website: 
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. 
Taylor

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