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06KYIV4299, UKRAINE: PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO FOCUSED ON KEEPING

November 17, 2006

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KYIV4299 2006-11-17 15:40 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kyiv

VZCZCXRO2432
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKV #4299/01 3211540
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171540Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0409
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 004299 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO FOCUSED ON KEEPING 
PM YANUKOVYCH ON EURO-ATLANTIC COURSE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary: In a 40-minute meeting November 17, 
President Yushchenko told visiting EUR A/S Fried that he was 
optimistic about making cohabitation work and his ability to 
move his relationship with PM Yushchenko and his team from 
coexistence to cooperation.  He expressed concern about 
several disagreements with the PM and Cabinet of Ministers in 
specific areas, but said that both he and the PM were 
committed to Euro-Atlantic integration as the ultimate 
guarantor of Ukrainian sovereignty and independence.  On 
NATO, Yushchenko said that he was ready to sign a MAP, and 
that agreement on a MAP would consolidate Ukraine behind 
membership.  Yushchenko supported the PM's December visit to 
Washington, noted that his Chief of Staff, Viktor Baloha, and 
newly-appointed Chairman of the National Defense and Security 
Council (NSDC) Vitaliy Haiduk both planned to visit the U.S. 
soon, and hoped that the Secretary and the President would 
both be able to visit Ukraine in the near future.  End 
Summary. 
 
From Coexistence to Cooperation 
------------------------------- 
2.  (C)  President Yushchenko said that although the internal 
political situation was complex, he was optimistic about 
moving from coexistence to cooperation.  Ukraine's political 
elites were not yet united and he had had a very short time 
to make that happen.  Former opponents now had to learn to 
work together for the good of the country.  Yushchenko said 
that he did not want to minimize the difficulties of the 
process, but that his long November 13 meeting with the PM 
had been very positive and that he was determined that they 
would continue to meet. 
 
Not Satisfied in All Areas 
-------------------------- 
3.  (C)  Yushchenko highlighted the fact that he was not 
happy with all the decisions made by the PM and Cabinet of 
Ministers.  He did not like the grain export restrictions and 
the control of grain process; he was not satisfied with pause 
in the privatization process; and he did not like the 
financial management provisions in the current draft of the 
budget.  Yushchenko noted that he was unhappy with the gas 
price agreements since there was no formula included for 
setting the price -- in the fact the deal had been agreed 
with the "sigh" of politics.  Also of concern were the PM's 
"contradictory" statements made in Brussels September 14, 
although Yushchenko was convinced that this was now an issue 
on his personal agenda with the PM and that the two teams 
were united in support of a Euro-Atlantic direction for 
Ukraine. 
 
4.  (C)  President Yushchenko was confident that the issues 
raised by the PM's team during the March parliamentary 
elections were simply campaign rhetoric.  Yushchenko was sure 
that there would be no more talk of federalism, of giving 
Russian the status of a second official language or of 
opposition to a united church.  However, it was important to 
find ways to resolve all of these issues. 
 
But Euro-Atlantic Integration Key 
--------------------------------- 
5.  (C)  Yushchenko said that he wanted to raise several 
issues.  He believed that Euro-Atlantic integration and a 
European direction should be the dominant prerequisite for 
the PM.  Yushchenko was clear -- only Euro-Atlantic 
integration could guarantee Ukrainian sovereignty and 
independence.  And Ukraine could not share in the economic, 
social and humanitarian aspects of Europe without being 
within the framework of its common defense structure. 
Therefore, it was critical now to raise the MAP issue and he 
was ready to sign.  This was an issue that he had raised with 
the PM; and he was satisfied with the PM's answers, but this 
was a question of taking steps and concrete actions.  If the 
President, PM and Speaker all signed on to MAP, then this 
would be an important step toward consolidating the elite in 
support of a common foreign policy and defense policy. 
Otherwise Ukraine's very independence could be threatened. 
 
6.  (C)  Regarding WTO, Yushchenko said that it was important 
to "go the distance" and expressed the hope that the WTO 
working group would meet in December and come up with a 
positive result.  He worried about the model of "harmonizing" 
Ukraine's WTO accession with Russia, noting that 
harmonization would mean that Ukraine would not be able to 
accede to the WTO for "several years."  Instead, it was 
critical for Ukraine to implement the entire package of 
legislation required for WTO accession.  He said that 21 laws 
had been passed in the first reading; Chief of Staff Baloha 
corrected him, noting that the draft law on metallurgy was 
 
KYIV 00004299  002 OF 002 
 
 
still being written. 
 
7.  (C)  Yushchenko described the "logic" of the European 
model of integration as beginning with WTO accession.  This 
would be followed by negotiation of a free trade agreement 
with the EU, and then sectoral agreements in 4-5 key areas -- 
energy syste
ms, space exploration and aviation, free media 
and democracy, legal and judicial issues and tourism. 
However, with the WTO accession, then "we would have to 
reject it all" and settle for a far lower level of 
cooperation. 
 
Looking for U.S. Help in Getting into Europe 
-------------------------------------------- 
8.  (C)  Although a date and time did not have to be fixed, 
Yushchenko asked A/S Fried for support with the Europeans on 
getting some indication that EU membership was possible at 
some point in the future.  What was not needed was yet 
another "neighborhood."  In particular, help was needed with 
the UK, Germany and France.  A/S Fried urged Yushchenko to 
ensure that Ukraine took the necessary steps to help 
themselves by fighting corruption and moving toward the 
Euro-Atlantic community; this was the best way to convince 
the Europeans that Ukraine was a good EU candidate.  In 
response to A/S Fried's comment that the Europeans were in 
disarray, Yushchenko quipped that "the Europeans themselves 
had turned into Euro-skeptics." 
 
Supporting the Bilateral Relationship 
------------------------------------- 
9.  (C)  Yushchenko foresaw a dynamic bilateral policy 
dialogue for the next year, beginning with a series of 
visits, including the PM's December visit to Washington -- a 
trip that he fully supported as a way to ensure the PM's 
support for his strategic goals for the country.  A/S Fried 
agreed, noting that the PM could use the visit to convince 
Americans that he wants to lead Ukraine into the 
Euro-Atlantic community.  Yushchenko supported trips to 
Washington by Presidential Chief of Staff Baloha and NSDC 
Chairman Haiduk and looked forward to visits to Ukraine by 
the Secretary and the President.  Yushchenko suggested that a 
"Gore-Kuchma" like series of meetings be re-established in 
order to balance the existing Yushchenko-Putin Commission, 
but in a "new version." 
 
10.  (C)  In specific areas, Yushchenko hoped that U.S. 
technical support for ongoing security reform would continue 
(military-to-military programs) and that the U.S. would 
continue to help on energy independence and conservation. 
Yushchenko also asked about continued cooperation in the 
nuclear energy sector, given Ukraine's current 100 percent 
dependence on Russia for nuclear fuel.  He requested 
continued USG support for the successful commercial venture 
with Westinghouse to produce nuclear fuel rods and diversify 
its supply away from complete dependence on Russia.  A/S 
Fried said that the U.S. was strongly in favor of 
diversification in this area and would help.  Yushchenko was 
enthusiastic about the MCC program, both the anti-corruption 
threshold program and a possible future compact, expressing 
the hope that MCC would provide the resources for a powerful 
development push and a "national breakthrough." 
 
11. (U)  A/S Fried did not have the opportunity to clear this 
cable. 
 
12. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website: 
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. 
Taylor

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