Skip to content

06KYIV4175, UKRAINE: TARASYUK ON COORDINATING FOREIGN POLICY

November 3, 2006

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06KYIV4175.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KYIV4175 2006-11-03 14:32 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kyiv

VZCZCXRO8962
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKV #4175/01 3071432
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 031432Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0259
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 004175 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: TARASYUK ON COORDINATING FOREIGN POLICY 
IN UKRAINE, OUR UKRAINE'S INDECISION 
 
REF: A. KYIV 4155 
     B. 05 KIEV 5100 
 
Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  A tired FM Borys Tarasyuk saw Ambassador 
late October 31 after returning from Estonia and Finland.  He 
diagrammed the current players in Ukrainian foreign policy 
formulation, stating that his role as the fulcrum was to 
prevent encroachment by PM Yanukovych's team onto 
Presidential prerogative.  On domestic politics, Tarasyuk, 
who is also party leader of Rukh and board member on the Our 
Ukraine (OU) bloc political council, said that Yushchenko's 
party People's Union Our Ukraine (PUOU) was still wracked by 
internal crisis.  On foreign policy, he reiterated Ukraine's 
commitment to a settlement in Transnistria but also his fears 
that Russia would use Kosovo independence as a precedent for 
frozen conflicts, regardless of the U.S. line that there 
should be no precedent.  Looking forward to the planned visit 
by PM Yanukovych to the U.S. in early Qcember, Tarasyuk made 
a pitch for us to push Yanukovych to make positive actions 
prior to the visit, rather than allowing him a free pass. 
 
2. (C) Comment:  Tarasyuk's comments offer fascinating 
insights into current dynamics in policy making and politics, 
but they also demonstrate how much slippage there has been 
for Yushchenko's team in the past three months since 
Yanukovych became Premier.  Four OU-affiliated ministers 
resigned in late October, with two being replaced November 1 
(ref A).  While Yanukovych told the Rada November 1 that 
Tarasyuk and Interior Minister would remain in place based on 
his understanding with Yushchenko, the Regions-led Rada 
majority passed a resolution November 2 to investigate 
Lutsenko and call for his temporary suspension, followed by a 
November 3 resolution obliging Tarasyuk and Defense Minister 
Hrytsenko to present a report on their performance November 
14.  Yanukovych warned Ambassador November 2 that if 
Yushchenko did not cooperate, he could see his other 
appointments replaced in the near future (septel). The steady 
ramp up in pressure and steady replacement of Yushchenko's 
ministers was predicted by most observers in early August 
when Yushchenko consented to appoint Yanukovych PM with a 
hybrid Cabinet but neglected to secure a new coalition 
agreement between Regions and Our Ukraine prior to the August 
vacation.  At the time, most observers suggested Tarasyuk 
would be the first of the holdover orange ministers to go. 
For now, he remains.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
Diagramming Ukrainian Foreign Policy Makers 
------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) In a throwback to pre-Orange Revolution practices, 
Tarasyuk drew a diagram to represent figures and pointed to 
the boxes avoid mentioning names (note: in a one-on-one 
meeting in his Ministerial office.  End note).  He placed 
Yushchenko as President in the upper left corner and 
Yanukovych as PM in the upper right; he was in the middle a 
level down, with lines drawn to both.  Deputy Presidential 
Secretariat head Chaliy fell further on the left under 
 
SIPDIS 
Yushchenko, with four circles for the advisers (Hryshchenko, 
Zlenko, Orel, and Fialko) under Yanukovych.  Tarasyuk noted 
that the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) should 
play a coordinating role for foreign policy, but it was not 
doing so yet (note: new NSDC Secretary Haiduk has indicated 
he will make energy security his main priority). 
 
4. (C) Using the diagram, Tarasyuk stated that he formally 
answered to both Yushchenko and Yanukovych, but ultimately 
his role was to protect Presidential constitutional 
prerogative in foreign policy formation from encroachment 
from the PM's team.  Chaly, who had served as Tarasyuk's 
First DFM for European Integration from 1997-2000 before 
embracing a "neutrality" strategy the past two years, was now 
"back on board" with Yushchenko,s vision of 
Euro/Euro-Atlantic Integration, according to Tarasyuk. 
Tarasyuk was pleased that ex-FM Hryshchenko had been 
designated as his primary PM office POC;  Hryshchenko had 
worked for him on arms control (from 1997-98), and they 
maintained decent relations (note: Tarasyuk's relations with 
the other three PM advisers, most notably Orel, are much 
worse.  Both PM Chief of Staff Lyovochkin and Hryshchenko 
himself have told Ambassador that Hryshchenko is the primary 
PM foreign policy adviser.  End note). 
 
Transnistria, Kosovo, WTO 
------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Hryshchenko,s floated proposal to raise the GOU,s 
profile on tackling Transnistria by having Yanukovych name 
DPM Kluyev or Zlenko (another ex-FM) as lead was a "bad 
idea," said Tarasyuk.  Apart from Presidential prerogative, 
 
KYIV 00004175  002 OF 002 
 
 
"our clear intent is to reach a settlement," and there would 
be better chances with a Presidential lead than via the 
PM/Cabinet of Ministers.  Tarasyuk repeated the standard 
Ukrainian "Moldova is hard to help" line, mentioning 
Moldova,s raising the freight rates after Tir
aspol's 
self-blockade led to trains taking a more circuitous route. 
Tarasyuk endorsed the enhanced EU involvement along the 
border (EUBAM) as a net plus, noting he wished it could be 
expanded to Ukraine's northern/eastern border (i.e., with 
Russia). 
 
6. (C) Hewing to the line he had maintained since December 
2005 (ref B), Tarasyuk characterized the U.S. line that 
Kosovo independence would not be a precedent for frozen 
conflicts such as Transnistria as weak, "because the Russians 
will use it as a precedent regardless."  Ukraine wanted to 
achieve a negotiated settlement on Transnistria, but Kosovo 
independence would undermine that effort. 
 
7. (C) Tarasyuk agreed with Ambassador that the handling of 
the estimated 21 pieces of WTO-required legislation would 
serve as the first serious indicator of a European direction 
for the Regions-led government and parliamentary majority 
(note: Septel reports that on November 2 and 3, the Rada 
overwhelmingly passed two of these drafts in the second 
reading, and a further eight in the first reading.).  While 
he felt that there should be no Ukrainian synchronization 
with Russian entry, he did not dismiss worries that it might 
happen, claiming PM Yanukovych's comment that Ukraine's 
accession could be considered by the WTO in February 
indicated a willingness to let the previous end of year 
deadline slip.  (Note: many, including Presidential 
Secretariat Deputy Chief Yatsenyuk and former Finance 
 
SIPDIS 
Minister Pynzenyk, have speculated the GOU is deliberately 
slow rolling WTO action at Russia's request in exchange for 
securing lower natural gas prices for the upcoming winter 
season.) 
 
OU still in crisis, Yushchenko still dithering 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
8. (C) While noting that his travels meant that he was not up 
to date on the latest developments, Tarasyuk confirmed that 
Yushchenko's PUOU party remained in internal crisis, claiming 
the old split between "Petro (Poroshenko) and Roman 
(Bezsmertny)" continued to play out.  A second lingering 
issue remained whether Yushchenko would take an active 
leadership role of the party.  Tarasyuk suggested that 
Yushchenko and Yanukovych were to meet early Nov. 1 to 
discuss whether a coalition was still possible or not. 
Tarasyuk,s Rukh party (one of six in the OU bloc) was 
adamantly against going into coalition with the Socialists 
and Communists, but wanted Tarasyuk to stay as FM. 
 
9. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website: 
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. 
Taylor

Wikileaks

Advertisements

From → CONFIDENTIAL

Leave a Comment

Post tour comment here

Please log in using one of these methods to post your comment:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: