06KIEV3371, UKRAINE: SCENESETTER FOR A/S FRIED’S SEPT 6-7
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06KIEV3371.
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06KIEV3371.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06KIEV3371 | 2006-08-31 15:01 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Kyiv |
VZCZCXRO0539 PP RUEHDBU DE RUEHKV #3371/01 2431501 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 311501Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY KIEV TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1245 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 003371 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM ETRD ENRG UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE: SCENESETTER FOR A/S FRIED'S SEPT 6-7 VISIT TO KYIV Classified By: Charge a.i, reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Your visit comes at a critical moment in Ukraine's post-Orange Revolution political development. While the primary gains of the Orange Revolution in societal attitudes, freedom of the press, and foreign and security policy remain, the orange-dominated political season is definitively over. The earthquake started by Rada Speaker Moroz's July 6 defection from a putative Orange Coalition and continued by President Yushchenko's August 3 appointment of Viktor Yanukovych as Premier was temporarily stilled by the August vacation season, but it will resume September 4 as official Ukraine rumbles back to life. The three crucial domestic political questions this autumn will be: a triangular struggle for power and influence between Yushchenko, Yanukovych, and Moroz; coalition reformulation (how much of Our Ukraine will join the coalition and whether the bloc itself will survive); and the development of a Tymoshenko-led opposition, in terms of composition, tactics, and targets. Three additional key issues for the fall agenda mix domestic and external elements: the struggle underway to define the outlines and tactics of Ukrainian foreign policy, with Ukraine's attitudes towards NATO and a possible Membership Action Plan (MAP) the most prominent; negotiations with Russia over gas prices in the lead up to winter; and WTO accession, with Yanukovych and his ministers sending conflicting signals. End Summary. A triangular struggle for power and influence --------------------------------------------- ¶2. (C) Much attention will be focused on the dynamics between Yushchenko and Yanukovych as the institutions of the Presidency and Premiership/Cabinet struggle to define power and influence under the new rules of post-constitutional reform. For now, the initiative seems to be firmly in the hands of Yanukovych. While Yushchenko formally on paper still has more power than President Kwasniewski had in Poland--a point Kwasniewski has made privately and publicly on numerous occasions--there is widespread belief, including among his dwindling supporters, that Yushchenko simply does not have the will to assert himself in a way which would serve the interests of his personal political fortunes, the institution of the Presidency, and Ukraine in general. ¶3. (C) In advance of naming Yanukovych PM, Yushchenko revoked a 2005 Presidential decree which gave the MFA the lead on foreign policy, including NATO and EU integration; Yanukovych followed the next week by abolishing the Cabinet subcommittee on foreign policy which Tarasyuk chaired, folding it under his own responsibilities. On August 28, the Cabinet of Ministers passed a resolution "forbidding" the President from directing the CabMin's work. Yanukovych is reconfiguring the staff of the Cabinet of Ministers to run political and security issues previously firmly in the domain of the President, and Donetsk clan lieutenants are taking over key economic slots throughout state enterprises and agencies. In contrast, Orange Ministers and their staff are looking over their shoulders, expecting eventual moves to unseat them. ¶4. (C) Wily fox Rada Speaker Moroz should not be underestimated or counted out of the mix, however. Moroz proved his skill in both the 1990s and earlier this summer in being able to maximize his leverage and pursue his own agendas. Unlike the communists, Moroz will not be completely at Regions' command, despite persistent rumors that his July switch was secured with a massive payoff. Moroz will initially focus on his pet agenda of completing the second stage of constitutional reform via a bill to decentralize power and budgetary authority, but he will also look for opportunities to increase both his own influence and the Rada itself, not just the Regions-dominated parliamentary majority. Some argue that Moroz intends to use his skills and position as Speaker to complete Ukraine's transformation into a state with a purely parliamentary form of government, eliminating the office of president or ensuring that the president is elected by the parliament, before the scheduled 2009 Presidential elections take place. Coalition reformulation: Whither Our Ukraine? --------------------------------------------- ¶5. (SBU) Yushchenko's patchwork election and parliamentary bloc Our Ukraine (OU) has long been the unruliest problem child on the Ukrainian political scene, beset by infighting, the total lack of party or bloc discipline, and repeated self-inflicted tactical mistakes. Both the narrower People's Union Our Ukraine (PUOU) party and the six-party OU parliamentary fraction have been badly divided since the March 26 elections over whether working with Tymoshenko and KIEV 00003371 002 OF 003 her bloc BYuT or lining up with Yanukovych and Regions was better for the party and Yushchenko's reelection prospects for 2009. ¶6. (SBU) Even after Yushchenko made his decision August 3 to nominate Yanukovych as PM and form a blue-orange-pink government, however, an expected new blue-orange coalition agreement failed to materialize, and only 30 of 80 OU MPs followed Yushchenko's lead in the votes for Yanukovych and the new cabinet. OU heavyweight Petro Poroshenko, denied a deputy premiership by Regions, scuttled the new coalition deal and kept his supporters out of August 4 votes. The entire Rada and most of official Kyiv then decamped for the August vacation season. ¶7. (C) OU is scheduled to meet September 1 to consider formally joining the coalition. Presidential Chief of Staff Rybachuk told us in early August that Poroshenko was so angry about losing a DPM slot that he might block any OU movement towards joining the coalition. The size of the OU contingent willing to join a coalition will be crucial in terms of balancing the Socialists and Communists in the coalition over certain policy issues. It now appears most likely that there will be an expansion of the existing Anti-Crisis Coalition rather than a separate new OU-Regions coalition agreement. Now that Regions has succeeded in obtaining the premiership for Yanukovych, there would be little to gain in abandoning the Socialists and Communists in favor of the divided and potentially unreliable Our Ukraine faction. An OU minority is guaranteed to refuse to join and could move instead into opposition -- although not out of the bloc itself in order to maintain their Rada seats. Opposition: To what? How? And By Whom? -------------------------------------- ¶8. (C) Tymoshenko remains out of Kyiv on an extended vacation as of August 31. Even her party associates profess not to know what strategy and tactics she will bring back to the fray in September, though she told them August 10 to get a good rest, because she was convinced there still could be a dissolution of the Rada and new elections by the end of the year. Tymoshenko will certainly be in hard opposition to Yanukovych's government and the Regions-led Rada majority. Her party members have been instructed to be present in the Rada when the session opens September 5 and BYuT removes the huge Ukrainian flag that has covered their seats since July. It is still unclear whether she will take active aim at Yushchenko as well, with an eye towards burnishing her credentials as the sole Presidential candidate for 2009 who has remained faithful to the promise of the Maidan. ¶9. (SBU) A minority of OU MPs and three Socialist MPs will join Tymoshenko in opposition, but the egos amongst the OU princelings and enduring rancor towards Tymoshenko will likely prevent emergence of a unified opposition. Talk of a potential single national-patriotic force died as soon as Yushchenko decided not to dissolve parliament, but some young OU MPs and leaders like Mykola Katerynchuk are likely to start working very closely with Tymoshenko. Tymoshenko will also be guarding her flank, since she expects a number of her BYuT deputies to defect to the ruling coalition soon after the session opens. NATO and MAP ------------ ¶10. (C) The struggle to define who controls Ukrainian foreign policy will largely focus on NATO and the GOU's desire for a MAP. While Yushchenko has notably upped the tempo of his NATO related public commentary in recent weeks, the key to going forward is now Yanukovych. Yanukovych's planned September 14-15 trip to Brussels will be crucial in this regard. Notwithstanding what Yushchenko thought was his agreement with Yanukovych for the latter to send a positive signal to NATO in August regarding MAP, something he made a precondition to nominating Yanukovych as Premier, Yanukovych did not do so. While Yanukovych as PM has publicly stressed the need for deeper cooperation with NATO and wider public education about NATO, he has avoided mention of a MAP. ¶11. (C) Furthermore, Yanukovych's foreign policy adviser Orel engineered a press statement allegedly quoting Yanukovych that that the GOU would not pursue a MAP at this time. Later Orel told the Charge that he was committed to closer and deeper coordination with NATO, but that a decision on MAP was a matter for the members of the coalition to consider -- and the Socialists and Communists had problems with the idea. Even Regions support could become shaky. Key Akhmetov associate and purported Donetsk clan political brain Borys Kolesnykov recently told the press that Regions was against KIEV 00003371 003 OF 003 NATO membership. However, thus far, the party has not made a definitive statement on MAP. ¶12. (C) In terms of gaining wide political consensus outside the communists about the need to move forward on relations with NATO via a MAP, and reaching out to Regions' blue base in the east and the south, having Regions inside the government rather than in angry opposition to an orange coalition makes the process potentially more likely to succeed. The question is the extent and speed with which Yanukovych will back away from the rhetoric used in the 2004 and 2006 election cycles and return to the decisions made when he was previously Prime Minister which brought Ukraine closer to NATO. This included the passage of the 2003 law on foreign policy and national security which clearly stated that aspiration to NATO and EU membership served as the basis for Ukrainian foreign policy. Gas and Russia -------------- ¶13. (C) New Minister of Fuels and Energy Yuriy Boyko has visited Moscow on working visits three times during August to discuss gas supply, but he is not sharing any details on a possible new deal. Yanukovych also started engagement with Russia in Sochi mid-August, but the path forward will not be easy, even for ministers more inclined to foster closer relations with Moscow than their Orange predecessors. Boyko has repeatedly stressed the positive role RosUkrEnergo (RUE) plays in affording Ukraine cheap energy, suggesting the non-transparent middleman, which Boyko helped create, likely will continue its role in any future deal. Public comments indicate the Ukrainians and Russians are still working on yearly protocols (rather than a multi-year deal), and the winter brinkmanship they entail may again be in the offing. Yanukovych and Azarov have said publicly that Ukraine's 2006 gas price will not change, but that prices in 2007 could reach $135-170/tcm. Since these price predictions are higher than those posited by their Orange predecessors, it could mean Yanukovych's government is trying to dampen public expectations, or may be facing a very hard line from the Russians. ¶14. (C) Boyko recently spoke out in favor of swapping local assets for access to Russian resources through the NaftoHaz-RUE JV UkrHazEnergo, thus pi cking up on a common refrain heard in European capitals. This UkrHazEnergo activity may be another aspect of "strategic cooperation" Boyko has previously mentioned, aimed at providing eastern Ukraine with cheap energy and those behind RUE with hyper-profits from Russian gas re-export contracts to Europe. To strengthen its position in negotiations with Gazprom, the GOU repeatedly has emphasized that it is filling its gas storage facilities with 130 mcm/day so that, come winter, Ukraine will have enough gas both to meet its needs and to provide reliable transit to Europe. WTO and domestic lobbies ------------------------ ¶15. (SBU) Yanukovych and his ministers have sent mixed signals on the commitment to pursue WTO membership at the earliest possible date. Yanukovych, in apparent contradiction to the Universal (national unity) agreement signed August 3, has raised the possibility of delaying the country's WTO accession until after 2006 to allow for additional consultations with domestic industry on WTO-related legislation. Deputy PM and Finance Minister Mykola Azarov raised alarm bells on August 7 by arguing for an increase in some tariff rates reduced by previous governments. The new government's plan to reinstate Special Economic Zones (SEZs) could also prove problematic for Ukraine's WTO aspirations. ¶16. (U) Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk, meanwhile, has continually stressed that all members of the coalition had already agreed to the end of 2006 as the goal for WTO accession, and that this goal remained GOU policy. In meetings with the Ambassador, both Azarov and Speaker Moroz have said that Ukraine would be a member of WTO by year's end. Minister of Economy Volodymyr Makukha also reaffirmed the 2006 date on August 29, saying that revision of past WTO-related commitments was "absolutely unrealistic" and that the GOU must instead turn its attention to passage of the legislation that remains outstanding. ¶17. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. Gwaltney
Wikileaks
Advertisements
Leave a Comment