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06KIEV2589, UKRAINE: BILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION WORKING GROUP

July 5, 2006

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KIEV2589 2006-07-05 15:06 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Kyiv
VZCZCXRO9507
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKV #2589 1861506
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 051506Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY KIEV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0279
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0606
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 5626
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE

 

S E C R E T KIEV 002589 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

DEPT ALSO FOR ISN, EUR/UMB, EUR/PRA, AND PM/WRA 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2016 
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC ETTC KSCA TSPA PINR UK PL UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: BILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION WORKING GROUP 
DRAFT AGENDA UPDATE 

REF: A. STATE 109786 
     B. YEAGER/UYEHARA 7/3/06 E-MAIL 
     C. KIEV 2451 

Classified By: Acting Pol Counselor George Kent, reasons 1.4(b,c,d) 

1. (S) We delivered USG response (ref A) July 5 to the 
Ukrainian government's (GOU) proposed agenda for the July 
11-12 nonproliferation working group (NPWG) meetings to MFA 
Arms Control and Military-Technical Cooperation Counselor 
Serhiy Kucherenko.  Kucherenko nodded understanding when we 
highlighted USG reservations regarding two of the three 
agenda items that MFA had suggested could include Polish and 
UK participation.  Since the Polish government was 
considering assistance in disposal of melange rocket fuel, 
MFA had suggested including the two government's 
representatives for a general discussion of 
destruction/"utilization" that included SCUD, Frog 7, and 
Kh-22 missiles.  We suggested that melange be listed as a 
separate topic. 

2. (S) Similarly, Kucherenko suggested Polish and UK 
participation would be appropriate for a general discussion 
of Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) activities, which 
included, inter alia, Warsaw's hosting of a PSI meeting 
recently and a Polish government proposal for a bilateral 
Ukraine-Poland hosted PSI exercise.  He said he understood, 
however, that third-parties need not be involved in the 
discussion on the U.S.-Ukraine bilateral PSI agreement.  MFA 
would schedule the discussions including Polish and UK 
participation on July 12, since Kucherenko said the Polish 
Embassy had informed him Polish Ambassador Tadeusz Chomicki 
was arriving in Kiev on July 11.  We pointed out that the 
NATO PfP Trust Fund discussion would also need to take place 
on July 12.  Kucherenko indicated his understanding. 

3. (S) When we previewed Department public affairs guidance 
on Russian government airing of the case involving diversion 
of Kh-55 missiles to China and Iran, Kucherenko said the GOU 
had asked the Russian government to explain why it had 
singled out Ukraine in its annual nonproliferation White 
Book.  Kucherenko emphasized that Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR) members understood that the case arose from a 
criminal violation by a Ukrainian company and was not a GOU 
violation of MTCR norms and procedures.  During the 2005 MTCR 
plenary, the Russian delegation had not aired any concerns 
when the Ukrainian delegation had updated the gathering on 
its investigation into the Kh-55 case and had also not raised 
the subject during Ukraine-Russia bilateral meetings in 
December 2005.  The Russian government had also missed 
another opportunity to present its concerns in April when 
Kucherenko met in Paris with Deputy Director Mashkov of the 
Russian MFA Security and Nonproliferation Office.  Yet, 
Kucherenko observed, Russia had suddenly singled out Ukraine 
as a missile technology proliferator.  Given the slowdown in 
government operations due to personnel on leave, Kucherenko 
noted that he did not expect a Russian government response 
for "one or two months." 

4. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website: 
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. 
Taylor

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