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06KIEV2297, UKRAINE: FM TARASYUK ON COALITION NEGOTIATIONS,

June 13, 2006

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KIEV2297 2006-06-13 16:09 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kyiv
VZCZCXRO7488
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKV #2297/01 1641609
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131609Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KIEV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9875
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

 

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIEV 002297 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2016 
TAGS: PREL MARR AMGT PGOV PINR UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: FM TARASYUK ON COALITION NEGOTIATIONS, 
SEA BREEZE, TANKOVA 

REF: A. KIEV 2281 

     B. KIEV 2280 

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d). 

1. (C) Summary:  During Ambassador's June 13 presentation of 
a copy of his credentials, Foreign Minister Tarasyuk said 
President Yushchenko's Our Ukraine bloc could not accept 
Socialist Party of Ukraine leader Moroz as parliamentary 
speaker, despite Moroz' insistence that this was his 
condition for joining the "Orange" Coalition that would form 
the next cabinet.  Representatives of the three potential 
Orange Coalition partners (Our Ukraine bloc, Bloc Yuliya 
Tymoshenko, and the Socialist Party), including Tarasyuk, 
were meeting June 13 to discuss the impasse.  If the 
negotiations failed, Our Ukraine would announce its readiness 
to enter into negotiations with the Party of Regions to form 
a governing coalition.  Tarasyuk assured Ambassador that any 
future coalition would make passage of legislation to 
authorize international military exercises its top priority; 
the question was not whether the legislation would pass, but 
when.  Ambasador also raised a problem with acquisition of 
the Tankova property for the new Embassy Office Building and 
passed talking points on the UN Human Rights Council 
(septel).  End summary. 

2. (C) Ambassador, accompanied by DCM and PolOff, presented a 
copy of his credentials June 13 to Foreign Minister Borys 
Tarasyuk.  MFA 2nd Territorial Department Director Anatoliy 
Ponomarenko and MFA notetaker sat in on the Ukrainian side. 
During the meeting, Ambassador urged speedy formation of a 
governing coalition and noted the damage caused by the 
prolonged uncertainty over the shape of Ukraine's future 
government.  He asked Tarasyuk for an update on coalition 
negotiations. 

Tymoshenko's Duplicity 
---------------------- 

3. (C) Tarasyuk assured Ambassador that his Our Ukraine bloc 
was doing everything possible to establish an "Orange" 
coalition of Our Ukraine bloc (OU), Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko 
(BYuT), and the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU).  As a 
member of OU's working group, he understood that the process 
of forming a coalition was not easy and, indeed, was more 
difficult than expected.  He accused ex-Prime Minister Yuliya 
Tymoshenko of colluding with SPU to force SPU leader 
Oleksandr Moroz into the parliamentary (Rada) Speaker 
position, which had led to an impasse that threatened to 
scuttle an Orange coalition possibility. 

4. (C) As evidence, Tarasyuk said BYuT had recently begun to 
support positions that it formerly opposed but which SPU 
favored.  Ideologically, he noted, BYuT was closer to OU than 
SPU.  SPU, but not BYuT, had opposed OU positions on topics 
such as eventual Ukrainian membership in NATO, WTO, and the 
EU.  SPU also opposed measures regarding privatization of 
agricultural land.  Thus, OU representatives had been 
surprised when Yuliya Tymoshenko backed Moroz' bid to become 
Rada Speaker.  Tarasyuk argued, however, that SPU should not 
demand the Speaker position since it had come in third among 
the Orange coalition parties; indeed, OU should have the 
right to fill the Speaker position since it had come in 
second.  Unfortunately, Tarasyuk commented, SPU's position 
seems to be locked in concrete.  Furthermore, once Moroz 
began to demand to be Speaker, Tymoshenko had distanced 
herself from the dispute, saying it was a matter to be 
settled between Moroz and President Yushchenko. 

5. (C) As further evidence of Tymoshenko's complicity with 
SPU, Tarasyuk said BYuT recently flip-flopped on recognition 
for veterans of the Ukrainian nationalist Ukrainian Insurgent 
Army (UPA) (which had fought in World War II on the German 
side) and now opposed it, which had long been the SPU 
position.  Tarasyuk noted that Tymoshenko used to favor such 
recognition to garner support from the nationalist electorate 
that was part of her political base. 

And Her Lack of Accountability 
------------------------------ 

6. (C) Continuing his catalogue of Tymoshenko's double 
dealing, Tarasyuk said Tymoshenko had categorically rejected 
procedures that OU proposed to ensure that she would adhere 
to the coalition agreement on principles and platform.  When 
Yushchenko was prime minister during the Kuchma presidency, 
Tymoshenko was his first deputy prime minister, and Tarasyuk 
was previously foreign minister, the government had created 
interagency government committees to vet draft decisions to 
be submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers.  The committees 
facilitated decisions of the Cabinet of Ministers.  When she 

KIEV 00002297  002 OF 002 

became Prime Minister, Tymoshenko had abolished the 
committees, granting her more control over the Cabinet of 
Ministers' work; as a result, Cabinet meetings had lasted 
12-14 hours, Tarasyuk claimed, while, under Yekhanurov, they 
lasted at most 3 hours.  Tarasyuk implied Tymoshenko was 
still grasping for greater control of government
al processes. 

The Our Ukraine Bloc's Nightmare 
-------------------------------- 

7. (C) The recent evidence of close cooperation between SPU 
and BYuT had convinced OU representatives that the 
combination of Tymoshenko as Prime Minister and Moroz as 
Speaker would create an insurmountable problem for OU, 
Tarasyuk concluded.  As a result, OU had announced June 10 
that it would wait for a change of position on the part of 
its potential Orance coalition partners.  The deadline for 
doing so had been noon, June 12.  Today (June 13), Tarasyuk 
said, the OU Political Council had met for several hours in 
the morning and, as a result, decided to call a meeting of 
the Orange Coalition troika, which had begun at 3:00 p.m. 
(note:  Ambassador's appointment with Tarasyuk was also at 
3:00). 

The "Wide" Coalition 
-------------------- 

8. (C) Tarasyuk said, if the troika meeting failed to resolve 
the Rada Speaker selection, OU would issue a statement that 
blamed SPU and BYuT for the failure in negotiations and 
declare that OU was prepared to create a "wide" coalition. 
Tarasyuk foresaw no problems in terms of economic issues, but 
OU would initiate discussions on whether Regions would agree 
to other OU conditions.  Tarasyuk denied that, in such a 
coalition, Moroz would still have the possibility of becoming 
Speaker.  A fundamental OU position, Tarasyuk averred, would 
be that Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych could not be prime 
minister.  In forming a coalition with Regions, however, each 
coalition partner would have the opportunity to select either 
a candidate for prime minister or for Rada Speaker.  In such 
a constellation, Tarasyuk claimed Moroz would not be Rada 
Speaker. 

Undercurrents 
------------- 

9. (C) Responding to Ambassador's comments regarding USG 
support for a reform-minded government, Tarasyuk noted that 
SPU appeared to have hardened its position.  When SPU had 
been part of the government, it had never questioned the 
Ukraine-NATO annual target plan.  SPU was now beginning to 
oppose legislative approval for the plan.  Tarasyuk referred 
vaguely to undisclosed parties (note: presumably Russia) that 
were influencing the SPU position. 

Other Topics 
------------ 

10. (C) On the legislation to authorize international 
military exercises, Tarasyuk said he was not worried about 
the legislation as such; the only question was the timing. 
The legislation would be a priority for whatever coalition 
that was formed.  Natalya Vitrenko's People's Opposition bloc 
and the Communist Party had been manipulated into mounting 
demonstrations against the Sea Breeze exercise, and 
unfortunately Party of Regions deputies had joined in. 
President Yushchenko had personally chaired a National 
Security and Defense Council (NSDC) meeting to consider the 
situation surrounding Sea Breeze, and the Ukrainian 
government continued to closely monitor the situation. 
Tarasyuk said he expected some "resolute" decisions (not 
futher specified) to be taken in the next few days. 

11. (U) Ambassador also raised acquisition of the Tankova 
site for the new Embassy Office Building, informing Tarasyuk 
and Ponomarenko of the latest obstacle to its purchase, and 
passed talking points on the UN Human Rights Council 
(septel).  Tarasyuk and Ponomarenko were surprised by the 
Tankova developments.  Ponomarenko promised to follow up. 

12. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website: 
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. 
Taylor

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