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April 28, 2006

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KIEV1698 2006-04-28 13:51 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kyiv
DE RUEHKV #1698/01 1181351
P 281351Z APR 06


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 001698 



E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2016 

REF: KIEV 1662 

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d). 

1. (C) Summary:  In an April 28 meeting with Ambassador, Our 
Ukraine legal department chief Roman Zvarych confirmed that, 
in ongoing Rada majority coalition negotiations between Our 
Ukraine (OU), Yuliya Tymoshenko's Bloc (BYuT) and the 
Socialists, two documents had been signed April 25, one on 
cooperation in regional legislatures, and another sketching 
the framework of a coalition agreement.  Zvarych described a 
complex series of working groups tasked to draft sections on 
the coalition program and rules of order for the coalition, 
leaving the tricky question of positions in government for 
later.  Zvarych said that BYuT was not taking much interest 
in the coalition program or rules, leaving this to OU. 
Zvarych thought BYuT would readily accept the program, but 
that the Socialists might be difficult to persuade, 
particularly on NATO and agrarian land reform.  Zvarych 
thought President Yushchenko was leaning toward accepting a 
deal in which Tymoshenko would be Prime Minister, but did not 
discount the possibility of Yushchenko changing his mind, or 
even drawing out the coalition formation process through the 
summer in a bid to prove that the Rada was ineffectual and 
that Constitutional reform should be revisited.  Zvarych said 
nonetheless that Yushchenko supported the efforts to rebuild 
an Orange coalition, constantly talking with OU lead 
negotiator Roman Bezsmertny about the negotiations and 
demanding a highly detailed document that would constrict 
Tymoshenko's room for independent action.  Zvarych said there 
were no formal coalition talks between OU and the Party of 
Regions, but that there had been informal discussions. 
Zvarych said that most instances of OU-Regions coalitions 
forming on the local level resulted from BYuT refusing to 
work with OU simply because of the difficulty in controlling 
local party branches.  Zvarych thought that the Rada would 
convene either May 16 or May 23 and that, after the new Rada 
sat, the outlines of an Orange coalition would be clear.  End 

Five hours of talk results in agreement on an agreement 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 

2. (C) Ambassador met with Our Ukraine legal department chief 
Roman Zvarych April 28 to discuss the latest Rada majority 
coalition formation negotiations.  Zvarych confirmed what 
Socialist Deputy leader Iosyp Vinsky told us April 27, that 
coalition negotiations between Our Ukraine (OU), Yuliya 
Tymoshenko's Bloc (BYuT) and the Socialists had resumed April 
25 (reftel).  Zvarych reported that a five-hour meeting 
between himself, Yuliya Tymoshenko (standing in for her 
hospitalized deputy, Oleksandr Turchynov) and Vinsky, had 
resulted in the signing of two documents, one a set of joint 
instructions to their regional party organizations on 
coalition formation, and the other a one-page document laying 
out the structure of the yet to be agreed coalition 
agreement.  When questioned by Ambassador about whether OU 
would reject this framework agreement, Zvarych said that as 
of this morning, the central committee of OU had not 
abrogated the document, and added his opinion that OU would 
not back out.  Zvarych said that, while Yushchenko had been 
quiet about the agreement, he had tasked Zvarych and lead OU 
negotiatior Roman Bezsmertny to write a comprehensive, 
detailed and concrete coalition agreement. 

Working groups within working groups 

4. (C) Zvarych said one of the main areas of contention with 
Tymoshenko was getting her to accept that the coalition 
program would drive the government program, not the other way 
around.  Zvarych said the coalition agreement would still be 
tripartite in nature, with sections covering the coalition 
program, rules of order, and spheres of responsibility (the 
language Zvarych inserted to cover government positions). 
Zvarych said working groups were being set up to write the 
first two sections, leaving the divisive question of 
personnel assignments until after the program and coalition 
rules had been hashed out.  Zvarych said the working group on 
the coalition program had five representatives from each 
side, and that the BYuT representative, Mykola Tomenko, was 
being cooperative and accepted the need for a detailed 
program.  Under this working group, there were seven 
subgroups, covering such topics as economics, finance, 
foreign policy/national security, political/legal reform.  On 
political/legal reform, Zvarych said one of the ideas being 
mooted was to remove the independence of the Prosecutor 
General, making it part of the executive, as in the U.S. 

5. (C) Zvarych averred that BYuT was taking a back seat in 
the drafting, letting OU do the writing with BYuT reviewing. 

KIEV 00001698  002 OF 003 

Zvarych said the working group on coalition rules of order 
had not met yet, but a document OU drafted was being reviewed 
by Mykhaylo Teplyuk from the Rada
legal department.  Zvarych 
indicated that BYuT did not care about the principles or 
program portion of the coalition agreement, and were letting 
OU draft it for their review.  Zvarych also indicated that 
public discussions would be held with NGO experts about the 
coalition agreement, with one being held today and 
discussions on the seven subgroup topics to be held in coming 
days.  Zvarych said a separate working group on possible 
amendments to the Constitution, staffed by ex-Constitutional 
Court justices and without political direction from OU, would 
also be held. 

Coalition program: Socialists problematic 

6. (C) Asked whether the program, when completed, would be 
acceptable to BYuT and the Socialists, Zvarych averred that 
it would not present a problem for BYuT, because Tymoshenko 
wanted to be Prime Minister and that would trump BYuT's 
posturing as left-leaning populists.  Zvarych thought the 
program would present more of a problem for the Socialists, 
particularly on NATO and agrarian land reform, probably 
resulting in a vague formulation on NATO in writing to 
satisfy the Socialists, but an unwritten agreement on the 
actual policy to be pursued.  Zvarych said he understood that 
a signal needed to be sent indicating that Ukraine wanted 
into NATO, and a signal would be sent.  On land reform, 
Zvarych said he wanted the land code incorporated into the 
civil code, a difficult proposition for the Socialists to 
accept.  Zvarych thought that the Socialists would eventually 
come around, because they wanted to be in power, with Vinsky 
pursuing the First Deputy PM job and Socialist MP-elect 
Anatoliy Holubchenko their likely choice for Minister of 
Industry.  Zvarych agreed that Tymoshenko could be useful in 
persuading the Socialists to acquiesce to the program. 

Yushchenko on Tymoshenko as PM: reluctant acceptance? 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 

7. (C) Zvarych said that he thought, with a certain degree of 
reservation in case anything unexpected happened, that an 
Orange coalition would be formed.  He thought Yushchenko had 
reached the conclusion that Tymoshenko being PM in an Orange 
coalition was inevitable.  Zvarych said that, while 
Yushchenko had a deep personal antipathy toward Tymoshenko, 
he also had objective reasons to fear her, because she was an 
"adventuress" who could undercut him.  However, Zvarych 
thought that if Tymoshenko could be pigeonholed with a 
specific list of tasks and requirements, it would make 
accepting her much more palatable to Yushchenko.  Zvarych 
said he thought Yushchenko was leaning toward accepting an 
agreement with Tymoshenko, but that he was still volatile, 
and could change his mind. 

Tymoshenko vs. Poroshenko: still adversaries 

8. (C) Zvarych opined that Tymoshenko was "locked in a 
dialectic" in which she was continually fighting with 
Yushchenko advisor Petro Poroshenko and wanted to "ruin" him. 
 Zvarych said he had not had any conversations with 
Tymoshenko where she had not mentioned Poroshenko in "irate" 
terms.  Zvarych said Tymoshenko "went off" whenever 
Poroshenko was mentioned for government positions during 
coalition negotiations.  Asked about the criminal 
investigation of BYuT negotiatior and Tymoshenko lieutenant 
Oleksandr Turchynov and its possible effect on coalition 
negotiations, Zvarych defended the prosecution, citing 
Turchynov's illegal eavesdropping while at the SBU, 
destruction of documents concerning crimeboss Seymon 
Mogilievich, and mishandling of the Gongadze case. 

OU-Regions contacts: informal only 

9. (C) Queried about contacts between OU and Viktor 
Yanukovych's Party of Regions, Zvarych asserted that there 
were only informal contacts between specific people in the 
parties, and that there was no formal working group between 
OU and Regions.  (Note:  This contradicts what Yanukovych 
told us April 27 -- see septel.)  Zvarych said that 
Poroshenko was in contact with Regions, as were local party 
leaders, but that only one local coalition agreement had been 
signed.  That was in Zakarpattya and had been brokered by 
Emergency Situations Minister and local powerbroker Viktor 
Baloha.  Zvarych averred that the coalition situation outside 
Kiev was "total chaos" and that the local party structures 
were hard to control.  Zvarych said local OU organizations 
were working against BYuT, because outside Kiev, BYuT 

KIEV 00001698  003 OF 003 

initially refused to deal with OU.  Zvarych said that in the 
Kiev city Rada, BYuT's Mykhaylo Brodsky refused to work with 
OU, trying to form an alliance with Mayor Leonid 
Chernovetsky, forcing OU to work with Regions.  Zvarych said 
Regions oligarch and MP-elect Rinat Akhmetov and Yushchenko 
advisor Oleksandr Tretyakov were talking informally because 
they had issues in common as businessmen. 

Rada sits next month... or this summer? 

10. (C) Zvarych said the Rada would likely convene May 16 or 
23, by tradition opening on a Tuesday.  However, Zvarych did 
not discount the possibility that Yushchenko might try to 
drag out the coalition formation process through the summer 
in order to demonstrate the ineffectual nature of the Rada 
and build an argument that the Constitutional reform package 
of December 2004 had been a mistake and should be revisited. 
Zvarych noted nonetheless that Yushchenko had said nothing to 
bring into question his dedication to a coalition agreement 
and was in constant contact with Bezsmertny on the coalition 
talks, insisting on an "ironclad" coalition agreement. 
Zvarych related one instance where he and Bezsmertny had 
showed Yushchenko a draft coalition program, which Yushchenko 
rejected as being insufficiently detailed in terms of 
responsibilities, tasks, and schedules.  Zvarych said he 
thought that by May 23 the new Rada would be seated and that 
there would be more clarity on where the coalition talks were 
going, with an idea of what the coalition would look like by 
early June. 

And the future? 

11. (C) Zvarych said that OU was "not suicidal" and 
understood that it had to form a coalition eventually, or 
else Yushchenko would have to call early elections, which OU 
would lose badly.  Zvarych said OU also understood that if it 
made a deal with Regions, OU would be destroyed by voter 
backlash.  Asked whether Yushchenko might opt for a 
relatively tranquil three and a half years of coalition with 
Regions, and no chance in the 2009 presidential election, 
over a tumultuous coalition with BYuT after which Tymoshenko 
would challenge him for the presidency, Zvarych replied that 
Tymoshenko might agree not to run in 2009 and that the 
"Yushchenko-Teflon" effect would protect Yushchenko from any 
allegations Tymoshenko could muster.  Zvarych speculated that &#x000
A;Yushchenko might not even want to run again in 2009, citing 
health issues, for which Zvarych said Yushchenko was taking 
"a lot of pills."  Zvarych continued that people close to 
Tymoshenko said she had no interest in being president.  In 
his view, Tymoshenko did not have a presidential persona, but 
he was not sure that her ego would let her realize that. 

12. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website: 





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