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March 29, 2006

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KIEV1241 2006-03-29 14:30 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kyiv
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIEV 001241 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2016 

Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d) 

1. (C) Summary:  Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) leader 
Oleksandr Moroz told Ambassador and DCM March 29 that a 
reunited "Maidan" coalition of Our Ukraine, Yuliya Tymoshenko 
Bloc (BYuT), and the Socialists was the only feasible option, 
and that he had told this to President Yushchenko during 
their March 28 consultations.  The SPU Political Council had 
met mid-day March 28 and voted unanimously, with two 
abstentions, in favor of an Our Ukraine-BYuT-Socialist 
coalition based on the agreement of principles negotiated 
between the three parties over the past two months.  The 
"grand coalition" idea of the Maidan three plus Regions was 
only possible in theory, since in practice it would be 
unworkable.  That said, Moroz was in favor of bringing 
Regions partly into power, though not into the coalition, by 
giving them the governorships of four or five oblasts where 
the "Blue" party held sway, plus perhaps a ministry like the 
Coal Ministry.  Moroz dismissed the notion that the 
Socialists might join a Regions-Communist-Socialist 
"Blue-Red-Pink" coalition; he also rejected the possibility 
of the SPU joining Our Ukraine and Regions without BYuT.  The 
key now, said Moroz, was for Our Ukraine and Tymoshenko to 
come to a mutual accommodation with each other.  End summary. 

Maidan reunited is the only option... 

2. (C) Socialist Party chief Oleksandr Moroz told Ambassador 
and DCM March 29 that the SPU Political Committee had met 
mid-day March 28, prior to his (Moroz') meeting with 
Yushchenko.  The Political Committee had decided unanimously, 
with two abstentions, in favor of a reunited Maidan 
trilateral coalition:  Our Ukraine, BYuT, and the Socialists 
(note:  this decision was reported in the press).  Moroz had 
told Yushchenko this when they met later March 28.  Moroz 
noted to Ambassador that the three parties had negotiated an 
agreement based on principles over the past two months; Moroz 
felt that the agreement should form the basis of the 
coalition, though it remained for Our Ukraine and Tymoshenko 
to work out a mutual accommodation with each other.  He 
personally saw no viable option to the Maidan team 

3. (C) Moroz supported the widely perceived notion that the 
largest stumbling block to an Orange rapprochement remained 
personality conflicts between Tymoshenko and not only 
Yushchenko, but also his inner circle, in particular 
ex-National Security and Defense Council Secretary Petro 
Poroshenko.  Yushchenko's inner circle would do all that it 
could to prevent Tymoshenko from becoming Premier again, but 
it was Moroz's assessment that that group favored an Orange 
coalition if it could be arranged without Tymoshenko as PM. 
Our Ukraine's leaders knew that if they were to cut a deal 
with Regions, they would lose the support of their political 

4. (C) Moroz described a three-way meeting March 27 between 
PM Yekhanurov, Tymoshenko, and himself; the session had 
started as a Yekhanurov-Tymoshenko bilat.  Tymoshenko felt 
that 240-250 MPs in the Rada that BYuT, Our Ukraine, and the 
SPU would command would be enough to function normally; 
Yushchenko at that point was looking for a wider base from 
which to govern.  That meant Regions. 

...but best to cut Regions in partially 

5. (C) Moroz rejected the idea of a grand coalition of Our 
Ukraine, BYuT, SPU, and Regions as too unwieldy in practice, 
joking that 400 Rada MPs would have to meet en masse every 
time a decision needed to be made.  Moroz also rejected the 
idea of an Our Ukraine-SPU-Regions coalition, saying the 
Regions vs. Our Ukraine/Socialists ratio of Rada seats would 
be too unbalanced.  Our Ukraine would be trying to use the 
Socialists as "ideological cover" in such an alliance, but 
Moroz would not allow that.  He would only consider 
participating in a more balanced grand coalition that 
included BYuT, but he believed that such an arrangement was a 
non-starter for Tymoshenko, and in any case it would be too 
unwieldy.  Yushchenko knows my position on this matter," he 

6. (C) While Regions should not be in the coalition, Moroz 
advocated bringing them "into power" by offering the 
governorships of four-five oblasts in which they clearly 
dominated the political scene.  Moroz said he had made this 
suggestion during his March 28 discussions with Yushchenko, 
as they discussed ways of healing the divide ("raskol") in 
Ukraine (note:  Moroz shared this suggestion with the media 
late March 28).  He also did not rule out the possibility of 
offering Regions a token Ministry, such as the recently 
reestablished Coal Ministry, or a key Ministry of Industrial 
Policy department, such as the Metallurgy Department or Ore 
Mining/Ferroalloy Department. 

7. (C) Moroz said that Tymoshenko was not opposed to this 
partial offering to Regions in order to give them a sense of 
belonging within the system of power, rather than being shut 
out completely.  That said, Moroz expressed uncertainty that 
Regions would agree to such a deal in the near future, since 
they were currently counting on
 negotiations between Our 
Ukraine and BYuT eventually collapsing, to give them a chance 
to cut a deal with Our Ukraine. 

Disappointment with the Socialist showing 

8. (C) Moroz expressed disappointment with the SPU's 
fourth-place showing (note: 5.8 percent, with 96 percent of 
the vote tallied), saying that the SPU had built a party 
machine throughout the country and had set 13 percent as its 
target.  Moroz chalked up the underperformance to "irrational 
factors," primarily a willingness for electorates to ignore 
performance in office in supporting local favorites, whether 
it be BYuT in Kiev oblast or Regions in Odesa oblast, two 
provinces in which the Socialists had expected to poll much 

9. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at: 




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